Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 20

India’s Ways of (Non-) War: Explaining New Delhi’s
Forbearance in the Face of Pakistani Provocations
curity officials met on November 29,
the last day of the bloodshed, to discuss
possible Indian responses. The gravity of
the situation was reflected in the meeting’s
roster of attendees, which included
Prime Minister Singh, the Defense Minister,
the National Security Adviser, the
heads of India’s two intelligence agencies,
and the service chiefs. 115 Although
Singh made it clear at the outset that
he was not in favor of another massive
mobilization of forces like Operation
Parakram in 2001–02, more limited
military options were thoroughly discussed.
116 Air Chief Marshall Fali Major
reportedly “suggested striking terrorist
camps” on Pakistan’s side of the LOC in
Kashmir. 117 Another credible account
of the meeting says that while Major
did say that Indian ground-attack aircraft
could hit training camps across the
LOC, he added that “precise coordinates
and adequate imaging weren’t available.”
118 Missile strikes against Pakistani
targets were another option, but “no one
could guarantee missile strikes wouldn’t
escalate into war, or even a nuclear exchange.”
119 As for potential ground operations,
Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
Kapoor subsequently raised the possibility
of a limited ground strike approximately
10–15 kilometers into Pakistani
Punjab. 120 According to one account,
however, both he and Major “made it
clear that they lacked the wherewithal
for war if Pakistan decided to escalate
matters, adding that the Pakistan Army
was unlikely to not retaliate.” 121 Kapoor
also told Singh that special forces operations
might well fail. 122 In another
meeting between Defense Minister A.K.
Antony and the service chiefs, Antony
asked Kapoor again about the prospect
of limited ground strikes. One reliable
account has it that “Gen. Kapoor is said
to have responded that an operation was
possible but he would need a week’s notice
and that it would be a ‘highly risky’
affair .... In the Army’s assessment, any
strike would definitely lead to an escalated
military conflict and the government
ought to be prepared for it. The air force
agreed that a strong Pakistani reaction
was certain.” 123 Covert operations were
also discussed, but the Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s external
intelligence agency “admitted that it had
no assets in Pakistan to carry out such
an action.” 124
In sum, secret Indian deliberations
about the use of force in response
to the 26/11 attacks were characterized
by deep uncertainty about
the likelihood and nature of Pakistani
retaliation, leavened with worst-case
expectations of significant escalation
potential. One thorough study of the
26/11 episode argues that “Indian officials
were genuinely conflicted about
how to respond to Pakistan. They certainly
did not want to risk a nuclear
exchange. They also wanted to avoid
undercutting a new and fragile civilian
government .... But they did not want
their country to appear weak.” 125 As a
consequence of this dilemma, senior
Indian officials signaled mixed messages
regarding their intentions, especially
in the early days following the attacks.
On the one hand, they periodically issued
warnings that all options, including
military ones, were on the table. 126
Accompanying these signals were stern
pronouncements, such as Mukherjee’s
veiled threat that “we are determined
17