Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 15

Indian Politics & Policy
corps—to the parts of Punjab, Rajasthan,
and Gujarat bordering Pakistan. 68
One account argues that, “in the event
of Pakistani noncompliance, the Indians
planned to launch rapid, multiple
strikes across the Line of Control into
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, destroying
terrorist training camps and
infrastructure and seizing territory that
would enable Indian forces to staunch
the flow of cross-border infiltration. In
case Pakistan sought to relieve pressure
on Kashmir by escalating the conflict
horizontally, Indian Army forces deployed
along the international border
would be prepared to meet and repulse
any Pakistani attacks.” 69 Another analyst
notes that “what distinguished
the mobilization of 1999 from that of
2001–2002 is that in 1999 strike corps
were not moved to their launch areas.
In 2001–2002, they were.” 70
Islamabad responded by mobilizing
its own armor and 300,000 Pakistan
Army troops to the adjacent border areas
of Punjab and Sindh. 71 In addition,
fearing that its nuclear forces might
come under attack, Pakistan “took alert
measures to disperse the nuclear weapons
and missiles to new locations away
from their storage sites.” 72 Early in the
crisis, Pakistani Gen. Khalid Kidwai,
director of the Strategic Plans Division,
the body responsible for the command
and control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal,
publicly stated that nuclear weapons
would be used against India “if the
very existence of Pakistan as a state is
at stake.” In addition, he pointedly set
out a number of red lines that would
cause Pakistan to respond with nuclear
weapons if deterrence failed. Foremost
among these was “India attacks Pakistan
and conquers a large part of its territory.”
73 Across the border, Indian defense
minister George Fernandes hinted that
“India had prepared its nuclear assets
for retaliatory use in the event of a Pakistani
first strike. 74 Fernandes added that
India “could take a [nuclear] strike, survive
and then hit back. Pakistan would
be finished.” 75 As if to underline this
point, India test-fired its Agni-I intermediate-range,
nuclear-capable missile
in January. 76
India’s compellent strategy was
partly aimed at inducing Washington
to urge Islamabad to stop supporting
jihad in Kashmir and India proper.
India’s arguments were bolstered by
President Bush’s post-9/11 doctrine of
targeting terrorists and the states that
support them. One account says that
“in the days after the Parliament House
strike, John McLaughlin, then the deputy
C.I.A. director, reported to the Bush
Cabinet that C.I.A. and other intelligence
analysts believed that, because of
confusion among Indian and Pakistani
decision-makers about when and how a
conventional war would escalate, there
was a serious risk of the first hostile use
of nuclear weapons since Nagasaki.” 77
On December 29, Bush called Indian
Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf to urge restraint;
he also implored Musharraf to
“take additional strong and decisive
measures to eliminate the extremists
who seek to harm India, undermine
Pakistan, and provoke war.” In addition,
U.S. and British officials devised
a coordinated strategy of back-to-back
visits to the region, “with an eye to de-
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