Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 12

India’s Ways of (Non-) War: Explaining New Delhi’s
Forbearance in the Face of Pakistani Provocations
short notice.” 34 However, by the third
week of June, the tide had begun to turn
in India’s favor. Indian soldiers managed
to retake two vital posts on the Tololing
Ridge in the Dras sector, which
overlook National Highway 1A, the
ground supply route to other posts near
the LOC. 35 By late June, Indian “mechanised
and artillery divisions [had] advanced
to forward positions all along
the border in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab,
and Jammu and Kashmir.” All army
leave had been canceled. Trains continued
to transport tanks and ammunition
toward the border in Rajasthan. The Pakistan
Army was making similar preparations
for war near its preferred point
of attack along the Punjab frontier. But
neither army “made any decisive movements”
of its strike corps, and New Delhi
remained resolute against crossing
the LOC. 36
The Kargil fighting intensified,
so did the diplomatic maneuvering between
New Delhi, Islamabad, Beijing,
and Washington. 37 Indian Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee and his Pakistani
counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, spoke
by phone several times in the early weeks
of the crisis, with Vajpayee telling Sharif
that India would do whatever was necessary
to drive the intruders back across
the LOC. 38 In response, Sharif refused
to accept Pakistani responsibility for
the invasion. Senior State Department
officials also urged Pakistani leaders to
withdraw their forces from India’s side
of the LOC. 39 During a visit to Beijing in
late May, the chief of the Pakistan Army,
Pervez Musharraf, was urged to pursue
peace with India, an “implicit rejection
of Pakistan’s efforts to internationalize
the Kashmir issue through its precipitation
of the conflict over Kargil.” 40 When
Indian foreign minister Singh met with
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott in late May, Washington agreed
to take a firm stand with Pakistan, in return
for which India reportedly pledged
not to cross the LOC or otherwise escalate
the fighting. 41 On June 11, Pakistani
Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz traveled
to Beijing a day before meeting with
Singh in New Delhi. The Chinese urged
“negotiations and dialogue” to resolve
the Kargil matter; once again, “China’s
non-mention of the United Nations or
a role for the international community
in resolving the Kashmir issue constituted
rejection of Pakistan’s Kargil
gambit and an implicit gesture toward
India.” 42 Aziz’s talks with Singh the next
day were unavailing.
As fears of escalation grew, U.S.
President Bill Clinton called Vajpayee
and Sharif on June 14–15, urging both
sides to resist widening the conflict. 43
But, New Delhi’s patience was wearing
thin. 44 On June 17–18, Vajpayee
aide Brajesh Mishra told U.S. national
security adviser Sandy Berger that India
might be compelled to escalate its
operations. 45 From Washington’s perspective:
“by late June the situation was
deteriorating fast. The two parties were
engaged in an intense conflict along the
Kargil front and both were mobilizing
their forces for larger conflict. Casualties
were mounting on both sides. Our
intelligence assessments were pointing
toward the danger of full-scale war becoming
a real possibility. The danger
was that the Indians would grow weary
of attacking uphill (actually up-moun-
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