Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 10

India’s Ways of (Non-) War: Explaining New Delhi’s
Forbearance in the Face of Pakistani Provocations
stan conflict episodes. The fifth section
is a comparative analysis of the four
most prominent explanations of India’s
strategic temperance in a nuclearized
South Asia. I assess how well each of
these arguments captures the pattern
of Indian caution, explain the relationship
between the primary and secondary
causes noted above, and elaborate
at greater length on why nuclear deterrence
is the most critical factor in the
Indian decision-making calculus. The
sixth and final section briefly examines
some implications of my argument.
The Kargil Conflict
In the spring and summer of 1999,
India and Pakistan fought a limited
military conflict in the Himalayan
mountains of the disputed territory
of Kashmir. It began when Pakistani
troops of the Northern Light Infantry
(NLI) covertly occupied a number of
ridges on the Indian side of the LOC,
which had been vacated by Indian forces
in the winter. 13 By May, more than
a thousand troops in civilian clothes,
operating in small groups, 14 had secretly
dug themselves into more than 130
posts along a 75-mile stretch of Himalayan
ridges, “up to five miles deep on
the Indian side of the LoC” separating
Indian and Pakistani Kashmir. They
were armed with “machine guns, antipersonnel
land mines, man-portable
air defense missiles, mortars ... and
light artillery pieces.” 15 Some of the intruders’
positions overlooked National
Highway 1A, which is the best road
between Srinagar and Leh—and thus a
vital ground supply route to Indian military
forces both on the Siachen Glacier
and along the sensitive border between
Ladakh and China. 16 The Indian military
discovered Pakistan’s intrusion on
May 3. Six days later, the Pakistani soldiers
destroyed an Indian ammunition
dump outside the town of Kargil. 17
New Delhi’s initial response was
to send in thousands of soldiers to evict
the aggressors. Special forces personnel
were dropped on to ridges by helicopter.
Indian troops equipped with
howitzers, rocket launchers, and heavy
mortars launched attacks supported
by helicopter gunships. “The aim was
to surround the infiltrators and choke
off their supplies even while building
up Indian strength to launch assaults.”
18 But, it soon became clear that
the army would need help. As Indian
forces attempted to push their way up
to extremely high altitudes—18,000
feet in some cases—they were easy targets
for Pakistani snipers and gunners.
Not only that, but helicopter gunships
were of limited effectiveness at such altitudes.
After taking heavy casualties,
the Indians realized that greater firepower
would be necessary to dislodge
the Pakistanis. The Indian Air Force
(IAF) was initially skeptical about using
fighter-bombers at Kargil, worrying
that it might escalate the conflict. The
IAF was supported in its initial caution
by the Cabinet Committee on Security
(CCS); however, mounting casualties
and subsequent consultation between
the army and air force chiefs led them
to conclude that the more potent IAF
assets should, in fact, be used. On May
25, the CCS ordered the Indian armed
forces to “take any action necessary to
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