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Part 2: The curious case of Brazilian bingo Part 2: The curious case of Brazilian bingo Those looking to become licensed in Brazil once sports betting opens up are hoping the country has learned some lessons from its unsuccessful attempt to legalise bingo 10 The failed attempt to introduce legalised land-based bingo into Brazil in the 1990s provides an object lesson in how not regulate gaming. Both named after footballers, the ‘Zico’ law in 1993 and the ‘Pele’ law in 1998 allowed the state governments, and then the lottery operator Caixa, to operate bingo halls to help fund the development of sports in Brazil. However, neither law definitively established legal clarity over either the licensing process or the gaming machine products that were soon established in the halls. The situation became worse when various state governments subsequently issued their own regulations and licences, apparently in contravention of the national laws. Though it was deemed that bingo was a socially acceptable leisure pursuit, the chaotic process of regulation – and the lack of oversight of the sector – soon saw it ensnared in organised crime and money- laundering accusations. Within 10 years, then president Lula da Silva called a halt to the experiment in 2004, a decision that was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 2007. An official inquiry said that the many bingo halls that sprung up became hotbeds of illegality and the weak regulatory structure saw them exploited by organised crime, helping in part to finance local election campaigns. BRAZIL The regulated opportunity in Latam’s largest market The bingo project findings The experience of the failed bingo regulation in Brazil attracted the interest of academics from the University of Kent, who embarked upon a bingo project in association with the Economic and Social Research Council. Their findings were published in a report in 2016. It included a precis of the chaotic regulatory system employed, where in some states the lottery took over the reins, while in others, in particular the state of Sāo Paulo, “two retired ladies [were] in charge of regulation without adequate regulatory infrastructure”. As one unidentified former bingo owner in Brazil put it: “Entrepreneurs soon realised that what they did would not be monitored and that’s what started the fragile relationship between bingos and the public authorities.” The central government attempted various forms of oversight in the wake of the initial opening up of the bingo market, ultimately leading to the second ‘Pele’ law, which transferred regulatory licensing and oversight to a Federal authority, the Nacional do Desenvolvimento do Desporto (National Institute for the Development of Sports, or INDESP). However, this body left in place unsatisfactory regulatory systems in 13 out of 27 states. After another corruption scandal involving INDESP itself in the early