Voices
* The anti-Morsi movement was
not the only one to take to the
street. The president’s supporters
were also there, pushing the probability of human casualties to uncomfortably high levels.
* An already-struggling economy
was being brought to its knees,
threatening the country with an
additional spike in unemployment
and higher inflation, spreading
poverty, a foreign exchange crisis,
and widespread shortages.
* No external party could aspire to
succeed in the role of intermediary. There was even a huge downside to anything that could be interpreted as foreign involvement.
* The army was the only national
institution able to play the role of
referee. But, having been burnt by
the earlier transition, the generals
were hesitant to step in for many
reasons, including the potential
for domestic unrest. They also
recognized the risk that their motives could be misinterpreted.
No wonder Egypt ended up with
what many regard as a messy,
noisy and uncertain outcome.
The military assumed power
MOHAMED
A. EL-ERIAN
HUFFINGTON
07.14.13
again and removed a democratically-elected president, suspended
a constitution that was approved
by a national referendum, and dissolved the only sitting chamber in
parliament. The reactions in the
street ranged from joy to despair.
And all worried about what the
The first popular
uprising two-and-a-half years
ago ... proved insufficient
to place Egypt firmly on
a path that ultimately fulfills
the revolution’s legitimate
objectives of ‘bread, dignity
and social justice.’”
immediate future would bring in
terms of clashes.
Some, including many observers
outside Egypt, have gone as far as
suggesting that this was a “military coup,” evoking images of Chile
in 1973. Yet the army’s intervention has the support of the majority of (though not all) Egyptians,
including those who were greatly
disappointed by its 18 months of
transitional government after the
outset of President Mubarak. It
has also been strongly endorsed by
virtually all political parties and