Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 47

Calculation of Goodwill
and Tacloban airports are located, so food and water, medical supplies, and other
humanitarian assistance could be delivered. The U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in
collaboration with the U.S. Embassy, Philippine government, nongovernmental
organizations, and U.N. agencies released funds to implement the first stage of the
emergency response, deployed disaster assistance teams to assess humanitarian
needs, positioned emergency relief supplies, and determined levels of aid. Also, the
State Department established a crisis response task force to facilitate coordination
with other agencies responsible for managing assistance requested by the U.N.
Humanitarian Country Team (USAID 2013).
Prior to the typhoon, multilateral assistance to the Philippines remained
relatively low from 2000 to 2008 but more than doubled from $40 million to $107
million between 2008 and 2009. The level of assistance increased at a slower rate
to roughly $113 million in 2010 and $123 million 2011 (see table 2). The increase
was made in response to disasters from earthquakes and other typhoons, as well as
to contain the conflict in Mindanao. Disaster assistance largely went to relief and
preparedness, which increased from 2.5% in 2007 to 39.2% in 2011 (GHA 2012a).
Regarding U.S. bilateral aid, USAID delivered $65.3 million for disaster relief,
recovery, and preparedness to the Philippines; in 2013 alone, it provided over $7
million in aid. Much of this assistance helped with the formulation of a disaster risk
reduction program and the adoption of an incident management system aimed at
enhancing the capacity of national and local governments by managing the causal
factors of disasters and lessening the vulnerability of people and property. The program
was implemented in response to Tropical Storm Ketsana (Ondoy) in 2009, Typhoon
Megi (Juan) in 2010, Tropical Storm Washi (Sendong) in 2011, and Typhoon Bopha
(Pablo) in 2012 (USAID 2014).
Complicating the humanitarian response was the government’s armed
struggles with rebel groups operating in the impacted areas. In Mindanao and adjacent
islands, conflicts raged between government forces and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), Abu Sayyaf, and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). This
was exacerbated by violent attacks by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Bangsamoro Islamic
Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and the New People’s Army (NPA).
In the immediate wake of the typhoon, the Philippine government reached
out to armed Communist rebels to cooperate with humanitarian relief operations
and help the government with reconstruction (Philips 2013). Just one month after the
typhoon struck, the government and MILF rebels signed a peace agreement, ending
a decades-long insurgency that killed tens of thousands. Although MILF gave up its
demand for independence, they won greater autonomy in Bangsamoro in Mindanao
(Marszal 2013).
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