Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 111

Review of On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World
backdrop to terror campaigns before focusing on the contemporary security concerns
associated with the “War on Terror”. He is adept at summarizing the interrelatedness
of cyber war, cyber terrorism, and cybercrime. Here, the threats posed by China, the
Russian Federation, and North Korea are pointedly noted as he stresses the complexities
associated with tracing the source of attacks and the severe consequences that could
impinge on civil and military capacities in the event of an all-out war.
Hughes-Wilson provides a lengthy but highly readable consideration of
military intelligence that succeeds in giving the reader a fairly comprehensive overview
of the practice of intelligence and security. While it falls short of the rigor expected of
an academic text in terms of theoretical detail and the provision of a comprehensive
bibliography and citations, it cannot be faulted for being unchallenging or lacking in
analytical content. The revolutionizing effect of technological advancement on the
gathering, dissemination, and evaluation of intelligence is cogently explained as indeed
is the underpinning rationale of his assessment that Julian Assange’s “Wikileaks”
project has succeeded in redefining security.
But it does have its shortcomings. For instance, there is no discernible standard
regarding the selection or non-inclusion of case studies. Also, given the contemporary
prevalence of asymmetric warfare, an examination of the role of intelligence in
conflicts between state and nonstate militaries would have been apt. The conflict in
2006 between Israel and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah would have presented an ideal
case study. It is clear to military analysts that a series of skillfully planned deceptions
and security strategies on the part of Hezbollah provided the means for the militia
to withstand the might of the Israeli Defence Force. A thorough consideration of
intelligence ought arguably to have included an appraisal of the darker aspects of the
use of intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency strategies. U.S. military intelligence
covertly orchestrated death squads using a recurring modus operandi to tackle
insurgencies in Vietnam, Central America, and Iraq while British army officer Frank
Kitson’s concept of “gangs and counter-gangs” was ruthlessly employed in Kenya and
Northern Ireland. In a similar vein, the use of anti-Warsaw Pact “stay behind” cells
under the command of NATO during the Cold War-era communist containment
strategy is not mentioned. Still, as a work which covers a great deal of ground and one
that attempts to synthesize a narrative and analysis of the broad aspects of process
and organizational efficacy within the political contexts of the day, it is likely to be
of interest not only to the connoisseurs of popular history, but also to scholars and
practitioners in the field of intelligence.
Adeyinka Makinde
University of Westminster
105