Forensics Journal - Stevenson University 2014 | Page 63

STEVENSON UNIVERSITY The embedded system undergoing analysis in the forensic lab must support debugging. While this is typically the case for a majority of microcontrollers it might not be the case for specific commercially available microcontrollers. However, despite a microcontroller’s support for debugging, it can and often will be, programmatically disabled with lock bits and/or fuse bits. Normally, these bit specific directives function to protect and conceal the internal programming, which is the intellectual property (IP) of the commercial manufacturer. These lock bits can also disable external access to data and flash memory resident on the chip further limiting forensic analysis. any electrical device to a (often wireless) network like environment. As devices like refrigerators, home security systems, automobiles, door locks, lighting systems and surveillance systems become more interconnected the potential increases that a criminal will attempt electronic manipulation or electronic molestation through malicious hardware projects. If these devices (e.g. home security system, door locks) have anything of value behind their functionality, then there must be an automatic assumption that it is a legitimate target for the malicious hardware capable criminal. The “Internet of things” is prevalent in the medical field. This makes homicide now plausible by way of leveraging the growing interconnectedness of embedded hardware enabled devices. For instance, implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICDs) and insulin pumps can now be controlled remotely and wirelessly. Newer devices recently approved by the FDA operate with wireless transceivers from a range of up to 400MHz, or roughly 400 meters (Kirk). In a disturbing malicious hardware example, security researcher Barnaby Jack from the security firm IOActive has successfully demonstrated how to take over these specific devices and turn them into murder weapons. Jack stated that not only is it possible to assassinate a target victim, “it is possible to upload specially-crafted firmware to a company’s servers that would infect multiple pacemakers and ICDs, spreading through their systems like a real virus” (Kirk). This presents an entirely different challenge for law enforcement and digital forensic investigators. Due to the number of microcontroller variants on the market, a consequence is that each variant requires a unique debugging interface and debugging methodology. Debugging is only industry standardized to a certain extent and requires a different level of understanding, expertise and interaction as compared to conventional computer based forensics. This means a digital forensic unit should be well versed in the more common microcontroller variants that are likely to be used by criminals. Without access to the internal memory or data storage medium within malicious embedded hardware, other less conventional forensic strategies and methodologies must undergo systematic and departmental legal scrutiny. Many devices will have to be externally stimulated in order to produce an observable output that can be readily interpreted. Improper external stimulation, however, can potentially cause unseen harm to the internal circuitry of the device. This approach will fail under courtroom scrutiny since the evidence may be considered ‘tampered with’ and device functionality is no longer reproducible if the device is damaged. There are two important prerequisites to effectively investigate and prosecute crimes involving malicious hardware. First, law enforcement and investigators must be aware of the expanding use of malicious hardware in order to quickly recognize its potential use in criminal acts. Investigators must recognize that an innocuous (or confusing) looking electronic device might be a key piece of evidence related to a particular type of remote crime. Knowing where to look for these key pieces of evidence is essential to solving complex crimes that incorporate technology. Second, a plan to forensically analyze malicious hardware is essential for all forensic labs. New forensic methodologies must withstand courtroom scrutiny, build on existing legal precedent while exploring new interpretations and reflect consultation with subject matter experts in the technology, forensics, and legal fields. WHY INVESTIGATORS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT NEED TO BE CONCERNED The ability to remotely commit a physical crime is a quality belonging almost exclusively to the domain of malicious hardware. Criminals will become increasingly clever in exploiting embedded systems for criminal acts. A critically important characteristic of malicious hardware allows a device to perform what a human could or would not. Timing of instructions and actions can be extremely precise allowing a device to execute criminal activities in a more reliable and consistent manner than a human could. Additionally, in an embedded system (or any computing system) the element of psychology is completely removed allowing the hardware device to execute unethical actions without emotional concerns or accidental abortion. Divorcing the