Forensics Journal - Stevenson University 2013 | Page 44

FORENSICS JOURNAL

The difficulty with reducing or eliminating terrorist financing is that
terrorist organizations have a multitude of methods to obtain funding and continue to adapt their strategies as techniques are exposed.
Terrorists use both formal and informal economic systems to fundraise and distribute money (Lormel, 4). Methods that utilize banking systems to transfer money between accounts as well as the use
of credit cards are considered part of the formal economy (Lormel,
4). However, terrorists also utilize an informal economy called the
“hawala system” which allows them to move funds in a manner that
is both, “discreet and reliable” (Lormel, 11). The hawala system has
been used for thousands of years, particularly in the Middle Eastern
and Asian cultures, to move money around the world without having
to set up foreign accounts (Brightman, 285). Aside from the traditional use, the hawala system is particularly attractive to terrorists as it
leaves a minimal paper trail. (Brightman, 285). It is a cash courier or
trade-based service where brokers (hawaladars) operating in different
countries communicate with one other to exchange cash or commodities without formally transferring money to each other (Samy, 7-8).
Individuals approach a hawaladar to facilitate the movement of funds
and with the exchange of a code the recipient receives payment (Samy,
8). Without funds actually transferred across a formal banking system
and hawaladars retaining minimal accounting records, it is very difficult for law enforcement to trace transactions (Samy, 8). Traditionally
used as a remittance service, terrorists and their supporters instead use
the hawala system to share and distribute funds in a way that bypasses
the regulations and surveillance of modern banking systems. By pursuing a comprehensive strategy to prevent identity theft in the formal
economy, more resources can be dedicated to investigating the intricacies of the hawala system and other informal funding techniques.

several fraud schemes in his attempt to detonate explosives at the Los
Angeles International Airport (LAX) during the Millennium celebrations. In 1999 Ressam illegally entered Canada from France with a
false passport and worked with terrorist associates to plan a chemical
explosion at the airport. He funded his plans by robbing tourists
and selling stolen documents. Ressam obtained a Canadian passport
under the name Benni Noris by purchasing it from a document
vendor and using a stolen blank birth certificate for supplementary
proof. He then utilized the passport to travel to Afghanistan where
he received al-Qaeda training and was requested to send back more
Canadian passports for terrorists to use. On his way to carry out the
LAX plot, Ressam boarded a ferry to enter the United States through
Washington state in a rented car containing explosives. Canadian and
U.S. border agents initially did not suspect Ressam to be a terrorist
as his pseudonym Benni Noris was not included on their watch list.
When border agents grew suspicious of Ressam’s behavior, he tried to
escape but agents apprehended him and found explosives in the spare
tire cavity of his vehicle (9/11 Commission Report, 177-179).
Ressam cooperated with the FBI for two years providing them with
information on al-Qaeda recruitment, training, and members (America v. Ahmed Ressam, 1882). He was given a relatively light sentence
of twenty-two years in federal prison with five years supervised release
as a result of cooperating with the FBI, despite withdrawal of his
testimony at a later time (America v. Ahmed Ressam, 1882). The case
of the Millennium Bomber indicates the investigative compl