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Flashmag November 2020 www.flashmag.net
This operation involved a paid informant, as well as FBI agents and support personnel who manipulated him for 3 months, with the design of commission of terrorist attacks on American soil. The FBI had supplied all the weapons with which Osmakak recorded a video in which he advocated revenge for his Muslim brothers around the world.
The FBI also gave Osmakac the car he allegedly planned to blow up, and even money for a taxi; so, he could get where the FBI needed him. Osmakac was a deeply disturbed young man, according to several psychiatrists and psychologists who examined him before his trial. He became a “terrorist” only after the FBI provided him with the means, opportunity, and final impetus to do so.
In 2015 The Intercept revealed that operations handling potential terrorists were at the heart of the FBI's counterterrorism program. Of the 508 defendants prosecuted in federal terrorism cases over the decade following 9/11, 243 were involved with an FBI informant, while 158 were the target of FBI-created operations.
Even though the FBI claimed that paid informants and undercover agents thwarted the attacks before they occurred; Several pieces of evidence suggested otherwise, and a Human Rights Watch report on the subject illustrated that the FBI does not always catch potential terrorists, but encourages people with mental illness or economic despair to commit crimes they could never have committed without their help.
With this kind of manipulative policy, it is easy to understand that the police state gives itself the means of violence, creating fake enemies to create a legal framework, where it exerts more violence, while withdrawing the rights of the people that must submit to new repressive logics, in order to ensure its security.
Ultimately, it is important to understand that the foundations of political violence have always been to get a message across, to strike minds, to bring about the dynamics of change in a situation deemed unfair by violence activists. However, the imperative condition is to not cross a certain threshold, beyond which violence would become counterproductive, in the perspective of the negotiation for change; because it would trigger the emergence of security reflexes that could take out the focus over underlying issues that had been imposed on the front of the stage. Similarly, uncontrolled violence could legitimize in response, a use of force, which could trigger a more difficult-to-control escalation scenario. Also, it is important to understand that when violence crosses this counterproductive path, it is not always the work of legitimate change agents, who are not able to calculate the risks and control the violence; but too often, it is due to the reaction of the agents of the status quo, who by manipulating violence, encouraging it, or allowing attacks that they can stop occur, expect to shock public opinion by discrediting the cause of the rebels forever, and thus win the battle of violence.
Hubert Marlin
Journalist
Sources: Political Violence in Democracy - Denis Merklen
In Cités 2012/2 (n ° 50), pages 57 to 73
The intercept - Trevor Aaronson - The Sting March 16 2015
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