Financial History Issue 133 (Spring 2020) | Page 31

Aerial view of two bombs making direct hits on the Japanese battleship Yamato, which is fleeing the 2nd Battle of the Philippine Sea.
it moved to invade the Southern Zone and a
way of securing important sea lanes for the
oil tankers that would soon be shipping oil
to the Home Islands.
By the end of March 1942, Japanese
troops had indeed conquered the Dutch
East Indies, New Guinea, many of the Solo-
mon Islands and large parts of the Philip-
pines. Retreating oil field workers in Bor-
neo, Java and elsewhere were only partially
successful in their efforts to destroy the
wells, pumps and refineries on those islands
and, thereby, prevent their use by Japanese
forces. Premier Hideki Tojo announced
that the country’s oil problem had been
solved; he was only partially correct.
The Japanese were able to rehabilitate a
certain number of oil refineries and build
some new ones throughout the South-
ern Zone. But they still needed to move
large supplies of crude oil and/or refined
products to operating bases in the western
Pacific and the Home Islands. During 1942
and most of 1943, the American submarine
fleet focused most of its offensive efforts
on Japanese navel targets. In the fall of
1943, submariners shifted their strategy
and began occupying important shipping
lanes in order to disrupt Japan’s oil sup-
ply lines. The results of that change were
dramatic. In August 1943, a large Japanese
tanker fleet was shipping about 1.75 million
barrels of oil per month from the Southern
Zone to the Home Islands. By October
1944, a much smaller fleet was able to send
only 300,000 barrels per month. By April
1945, the almost non-existent commercial
fleet was no longer able to supply the
Home Islands with this vital commodity.
Japan’s problems in maintaining ade-
quate supplies of oil affected not only
strategic choices made by the country’s
leaders, but also tactical decisions made by
local military commanders.
• In mid-1942, naval officers concerned
about the large amounts of fuel used in
the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway
felt constrained in fully deploying their
fuel-eating battleships in subsequent
operations in the Solomons and the
Marianas.
• In the Battle of the Philippine Sea in
June 1944, Admiral Teijiro Toyoda had
to deploy his fleet in a place convenient
for refueling, not the place which tacti-
cal considerations dictated.
• Aviators of the Imperial Japanese Navy
Air Service suffered from the lack of
suitable training and “stick time” due to
the shortage of aviation fuel.
• In the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October
1944, when US Admiral Bull Halsey left
American forces exposed to attack by
Japanese ships, that enemy fleet simply
did not have enough fuel to take advan-
tage of the opportunity.
In April 1945, Admiral Toyoda sent
the half-fueled battleship Yamato and
an eight-ship escort out of the protected
home waters and straight into the Ameri-
can fleet supporting the invasion of Oki-
nawa. US aviators sunk the Yamato and
five of her escorts before they could do any
meaningful damage. Subsequent bomb-
ing attacks on Japan’s mostly inactive oil
refining industry were followed by the
incendiary and nuclear attacks that ulti-
mately caused Emperor Hirohito to agree
to the surrender of all Japanese military
forces in August.
Germany Tackles Similar Problems
During the 1930s, Germany was confront-
ing its own challenges in obtaining the
large supply of oil that would be needed
as Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich attempted to
control continental Europe and beyond.
The parallels with Japan were striking:
Germany had begun replacing coal with
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