afford to export, but instead with a barter
system of fancy French goods — particu-
larly furniture — of which there was a glut,
likely due to changing tastes in which the
revolutionary-minded French discarded
items reminiscent of the Bourbon dynasty
headed by the soon-to-be beheaded Louis
XVI. Swan correctly ascertained that there
was now a market for fine furniture, stat-
ues, mirrors and clocks from the former
mansions of the nobility, along with silks,
satins and laces.
Swan urged the commission to main-
tain secrecy involving all such commercial
operations. An example of such secrecy
put into action was Swan’s merger with a
Swiss banker from Zurich names Johann-
Caspar Schweizer, who had long been
based in Paris. This merger was not Swan’s
idea, but instead an appointment by a
new version of the commission respon-
sible for commerce. To keep this merger
more secretive, Swan and Schweizer were
referred to in official correspondence as
“Jones & Gaspard.” In addition to the
aforementioned luxury goods, Swan and
Schweizer were occasionally paid in gold,
as a result of the melting down of ecclesi-
astical ornaments and other confiscated
objects seized by an increasingly-radical
and secular French government.
When Swan returned to the United
States in December of 1794, he soon estab-
lished the headquarters of Swan and Sch-
weizer at Philadelphia, probably because it
was the nation’s capital and had the high-
est concentration of wealthy people who
could afford the French luxuries. Swan
also set up shops in New York, Baltimore,
Charleston, South Carolina, Newport,
Salem and Boston. This was partly to take
advantage of each region’s predominant
product that could be used by France,
such as rice from Charleston; fish from
Boston; and flour, cornmeal, beef and
pork from the various other ports.
The influx of formal French furniture and
other goods into Boston by Swan largely
explains the existence of a “Swan Suite” at
the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, which
features very formal and gold-gilt covered
French furniture and the portraits of Swan
and his wife painted by Gilbert Stuart.
In January 1795, the French govern-
ment provided an important credit at the
disposal of Swan and Schweizer. The com-
mittee of public safety declared that Swan
was empowered to negotiate for a final
liquidation of the debt of the United States
to France, and to employ these funds for
the purchase of food for France.
Alexander Hamilton’s financial policies
facilitated the commencement of regular
payments of the US debt to France in
1790, but the final payments would not be
made until 1802. The French leadership
declared they could not wait that long, due
to political desperation and the dire need
for food and other key necessities.
Swan was at the right place at the right
time. He wrote to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., who
had succeeded Hamilton as Secretary of
the Treasury, a half-dozen times in May
and June of 1795. In the initial letter he
wrote, in part:
…Enclosed I have the honor of trans-
mitting you the original of an Arreté
or Decision of the Committee of Salut
public, or public Safety of the National
Convention of the 25 th January last,…
by which you will perceive that the
debt of the United States to France, is
put at my disposition, and that I am
authorized to finally liquidate the said
debt and receive the reimbursement of
it from these States.
In an agreement signed on June 15,
Wolcott, representing the US govern-
ment, agreed to pay Swan, as agent of
the French Republic, US stock certificates
valued at $2,024,900 — the amount owed
to the French that included principal,
interest and arrears.
Several days later, Wolcott wrote to
Hamilton, asking for his advice regarding
Swan, even though the agreement had
already been signed:
This Mr. Swan has proposed to me
to contract to pay our Interest in
Specie in Holland & when done to
receive payment here at par. He ha(s)
immense funds at command here &
as he says in France. (His) ability can-
not be doubted. (All the) objections
which exist will occur to you. Suppos-
ing I contract with him & at the same
time authorize our Comrs. to draw
on the Treasury, if he fails to com-
ply — will the provision be adequate
or what better can be done? The ship-
ment of produce is impracticable. The
French Agents command everything
& the risque & probable loss would be
imm ense. On this point will you drop
me a line soon.
In essence, Swan had just bailed out the
United States’ debt with France and was
able to turn his bailout into a profit for
himself, further resurrecting the financial
and social standing he had enjoyed after
marrying the wealthy heiress, Hepzibah,
back in 1776.
Damien Cregeau is an independent his-
torian, who earned his B.A. in history
from Hillsdale College and his M.A. in
history from Colorado State. A scholar
of the era of the American Revolution, he
frequently presents on spies in the Revo-
lutionary War throughout the Northeast.
He can be reached at damien_cregeau@
hotmail.com.
Sources
Massachusetts Provincial Accounts 1770–1776.
Accounts of the Committee of Safety and
Supplies. Boston: Massachusetts Archives.
Volume 255, p. 822.
Merrill, Jane and John Endicott. Aaron Burr in
Exile: A Pariah in Paris, 1810–1811. McFar-
land. 2016.
Rice, Howard. “James Swan: Agent of the
French Republic, 1794–1796” The New Eng-
land Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 464–486.
September 1937.
Small, Herman Wesley. A History of the Town
of Swan’s Island, Maine. 1898.
“Swan’s Proposals for Supplying American
Beef, &c. to the French Government, 19 July,
1788.” Founders Online. National Archives.
Winthrop, James. “Recollections of the Battle
of Bunker Hill.” Analectic Magazine. 1818.
www.MoAF.org | Fall 2017 | FINANCIAL HISTORY 27