Bricolage or Entrepreneurship ?
Policy |
Windows , |
Failed |
Entrepreneurship , |
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Contingent |
Framing |
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Problem |
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The process tracing of the three streams has let us to draw a precise image of the context . Before investigating the framing of the SARS , some of these contextual elements must be clarified in order to understand why some conditions that could be interpreted as windows of opportunity did not lead to change and why some agents who could be interpreted as policy entrepreneurs did not succeed in coupling the streams .
The first case would be to address the Charter Group . The Charter Group was arguably demonstrating some elements of policy entrepreneurship . Nevertheless , it is not a good fit for the MSA : the Charter Group was an experiment that happened outside of the traditional decisionmaking channels , its relationship with the decision makers was different from a policy entrepreneur seeking access to decision makers . The decision-making process of setting up a network for the epidemiological surveillance in 1998 could hardly be considered a coupling of the streams : the change is minimal and the result is a formalization of the EU ’ s sponsorship of the initiative . Therefore , there is here a form of entrepreneurship with minimalist goals and fostering change at a modest level rather than by starting a complete policy cycle .
The second case is the policy entrepreneurship behind the ECID that fits the traditional definition . It is a case of failed entrepreneurship , probably due to the limited outreach of the proposal presented by Michel Tibayrenc and his lack of access to EU institutions . There was a change in the politics stream that happened just before , but the relative weakness of the EP did not allow a proper window to be opened . Eventually , the ECID remained a policy idea that was stifled by the debate in the policy community and efforts to make it emerged never met the right opportunity .
The final case before the SARS crisis is the opening of policy window where a change in the problem streams due to Mad Cow disease and the Anthrax attacks led the Member States to become ripe to the idea of an agency . Moreover , the new Commissioner for health who had taken office in 1999 seemed more receptive to the creation of an agency . Despite a window of opportunity being arguably opened , no agent emerged as a policy entrepreneur to set the agenda . The Commissioner for Health , Byrne , only mentions that he and his team had “ committed to themselves ” to creating a European Centre for Disease Control by 2005 . There were no clear preferences stated on the precise organizational elements of this agency and the policy idea was exposed vaguely . Moreover , he was giving a speech for an audience of young specialists of public health in a forum dedicated to health issues in the EU ( European Commission 2002 ) and there was no other evidence that there had been a concrete effort made to put the issue on the agenda . Perhaps the Commission could have exercised some entrepreneurship if the salience of SARS had not had an overwhelming impact on the problem stream only 2 months after Commissioner Byrne ’ s announcement . Empirical
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