European Policy Analysis
participated in the meeting of the Charter group . Eventually , the results of the prioritization of communicable diseases were communicated to the EU Commission as “ expert advice ” ( Newton , Grimaud , and Weinberg , 1999 ). The support for this idea culminated in 1999 with the proposal for a decision creating a network for the epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases in the European Communities , mentioned earlier .
The institutional bargaining that occurred during the decision-making on the proposal for a decision offers precise insights to map the institutions ’ preferences on the control and prevention of diseases . In the case of the EP , this happens in a context of growing hostility towards agencification where new agencies are seen as an “ irresponsible ” development of the European Executive that endangers the balance of power between elected bodies and technocratic institutions ( Lord 2011 , 912 , quoting the Herman Report , European Parliament 1999 ). Nevertheless , the EP has demonstrated no suspicion toward the creation of an agency dedicated to the surveillance , control , and prevention of communicable diseases and even championed the creation of an institution from the beginning ( Bowis 2004 ). What explains the role of the EP in championing the Agency approach rather than the Network approach ? The agency idea presents technical characteristics that leave room for a greater oversight of the EP . While agencification is usually seen as a phenomenon that accentuates deparliamentarization ( Lord 2011 , 913 ), the case of the ECDC differs from policy sectors of exclusive competences . The EP ’ s preferences were formulated in a policy vacuum and it is then not surprising that an institution traditionally eager to secure oversight makes the choice of the most institutionalized option . Lord comes to this conclusion about the EP when the other option is a “ voluntary pattern of co-operation ” ( 2011 , 915 ). Kelemen ( 2014 ) underlines that , where the EP has influence over agency design , it tends to weight on the creation of bureaucratic structures to enhance the transparency and accountability of agencies . The EP thus favors the Agency idea because it gives the Agency a stronger value acceptability than a network approach , based on oversight considerations . The amendments of the EP have been consistently suggesting creating a center rather than a network : “ Having regard to the current shortcomings in the structures for the epidemiological surveillance of communicable diseases in the Member States and , therefore , the need to establish a permanent structure at Community level ”; and suggests “ collecting information relating to epidemiological surveillance and coordinating control measures in order then to forward them to a central body : the European Centre for the Surveillance of Communicable Diseases .” ( Cabrol 1997 ).
This approach was systematically countered by the EU Commission and the Council : “ The situation is so diverse that one cannot talk about ‘ shortcomings in structures ’. It would be wiser to refer to ‘ increasing needs ’. The common position has largely taken over the text of the Commission ' s amended proposal ”; “ The term ‘ Eurocentres ’ does not properly describe these structures , whose activities are mainly geared towards national surveillance . […] On the contrary , it
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