They did it , and now the UK and its current , as well as future , European partners have to deal with a situation only a few observers were actually expecting to happen . All had to learn the hard way , that neither traditional political pollsters nor the London bookies were correctly anticipating the outcome of the referendum of June 23rd , and it seems that even the “ Brexiteers ” were surprised by the choice of the voters ( Sapir 2016 ). The business of vote forecasting in times of political polarization is a difficult one , and has become even more difficult with the change of people from analogue to digital technologies . The outcome of the referendum indicates that the leave camp was extremely successful in dissipating an overwhelmingly converging expert view of negative economic effects , medium term as well as long-term , of a Brexit . Moreover , giving the then PM Cameron and his treasurer Osborne the opportunity to be ‘ the ’ stay proponents was not helping the stay camp at all , as voters were well aware of the negativism of both politicians toward the EU . Nor was the weak and very undecided position of the Labour leaders that left traditional Labour voters in the unknown about the preferences of their party . The pro-leave majority may have not been an overwhelming victory but a result of close to 52 % of all votes still handed the Brexit faction a strong mandate to bid farewell to the EU .

A strong mandate , though , does not mean that Brexit will happen soon . As a matter of fact , the newly configured British government may wait for quite a while until it is ready and willing to trigger article 50 of the TFEU ( Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ). This postponement reflects , on the one side , the enormous complexity of the task at hand and , on the other side , the strategic consideration on the side of the British government that hopes for some EU-tiredness of old and — after the next election round — potentially new governments in core EU countries . Given the political mood in countries like Germany , France , and Italy — to name a few — such a Brexitapproach actually may be a realistic way to get as many concessions as possible from the side of the European Council . More so , the delay in triggering article 50 also reflects the fact that the main proponents seem not have had a convincing and operative plan how to actually leave the EU and what kind of relations should be put in place with its European partners . In this regard , it was a strategically wise decision by PM May to hand responsibilities for the operation Brexit into the hands of three main “ Brexiteers ”. If they will not succeed in coming up with at least a cost-neutral hard Brexit , then she always can make the case for a soft Brexit . To keep this

Institute for European Studies , University of British Columbia , Canada doi : 10.18278 / epa . 2.2.1

European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 4

Understanding Brexit

Understanding Brexit