Migration of Greek Physicians to Germany
labor markets and specifically on the health sectors of both countries is significant , in order to illuminate this migration case .
Furthermore , and in connection with the arguments of Hoesch , I assume that the different types of health sectors in these countries ( a mixed model of Beveridge and Βismarckian system in Greece and the traditional Βismarckian model in Germany ) directly affect and shape the migration case of the Greek physicians who undertake their medical specialization training in Germany . In particular , the political developments in Greece during the last several years , which negatively affected 1 the Greek public health sector , such as the role of the key actors in health sector workforce planning in Greece and in Germany , is expected also to influence this migration case decisively .
Reasonably , Iredale ’ s approach about the role of professional bodies in the migration of health professionals should also be considered in context with the second research question , as well as with the second hypothesis . According to Iredale , professional bodies and associations can play a key role in regulating entry into a health sector for foreign health workers , since this mandate is no longer controlled solely by government players ( 2001 ). Of course , a precondition for this is the overcoming of national boundaries for foreign health personnel . This can happen through resident and work permits , which are basically being granted by state actors . However , the professional bodies are likely to be responsible for the recognition of qualifications and the issuing of professional licenses , in this way regulating the labor market in health sectors for foreign physicians . For example , if the professional bodies of medical professions possess sufficient power through the mentioned responsibilities , and if at the same time the proportion of migrants in the labor market is also significant , they try to define wellestablished criteria for the recognition of the foreign qualifications ( Iredale 2001 ). Additionally , as Hoesch stated , “ while professional actors quite often justify restrictive admission policies with the aim to preserve high-quality standards , it is obvious that other interests — mainly keeping away too much competition — are also driving forces ” ( 2012 , 6 ). Apart from the power of professional bodies , the role of transnational or supranational agreements — e . g . the law framework of the EU for free movement , free establishment , and provision of services — is also crucial for the issue of recognizing qualifications , such as those regulating resident and work permits ( Iredale 2001 , 11 ).
Consequently , the analysis of the health sectors of both countries should not only highlight their main characteristics and structures , but also emphasize the role of gatekeepers of the health sector ’ s labor market and illuminate the key actors within them . It is also necessary that the present article will focus on the form of labor markets and inequities between them , which have resulted from decision-making and interaction of the relevant political players and the key actors in the health sectors .
Material and Methods . The present article bases its findings on three main sources of data , both quantitative and qualitative , which will be presented in the following .
1
See the section “ Overview of the Greek health system ”.
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