State and Regional Administrative Coordination in Spain
These views coincide with the data taken from the analysis of the Sectoral Conference meeting agendas . Looking at the data concerning the items on the agenda of the Environment and Education Sectoral Conference meetings during the 2001 – 12 period , it can be seen that the percentages of items put forward by the ministry are 91.8 % and 87.4 %, respectively ( Tables 2 and 3 ).
Even considering the periods when people belonging to different parties are at the head of the ministry , it can be seen that the pattern hardly varies ( Graphs 2 and 3 ). This shows how exceptional it is for regional actors to propose items for discussion , whichever party is in government .
In short , when drawing up meeting agendas , a clearly centralist vision rules . According to this vision , the government practically controls the matters to be discussed at meetings , applying a topdown way of thinking that does not involve the principle of horizontality that should be at least partially employed by a body intended for co-government and cooperative federalism .
(…) the problem in terms of leadership is , of course , that everyone ’ s personality is very important , but what is even more important is the fact that normally the capacity to propose matters lies with the ministry . (…) So the leadership is an almost absolute leadership by the ministry . This is not so much due to the personality of whichever minister it is , but because really there has been a series of issues related to the Sectoral Conference in which the only capacity for initiative came from
the minister in office . ( Interview 11 )
Once the agenda is set , the decisionmaking process undertaken at the
Sectoral Conferences further illustrates the central importance of the ministers and their privileged position over regional representatives . In accordance with the rules regulating the operation of these conferences , agreements are adopted with the assent of conference members and , in the absence of this , by the favorable vote of the State ’ s administration and the majority of the Autonomous Regions . According to the operational dynamic reported by the interviewees , the issues are presented by the minister , they are debated and , if there are no major discrepancies , the minutes show that they have been approved . In fact , most of the regional ministers interviewed did not remember having voted at the Sectoral Conferences . In most cases , the ministry presents its proposals and the representatives of the Autonomous Regions give their opinion , but there is no vote . Most often , those participating at the conferences assent to what the minister has announced . The conferences seek consent at all times and when there are controversial matters , there is an attempt to resolve disagreements at the commission stage , that is to say , at the Sectoral Conference ’ s preparatory meeting ; when this is not possible , consensus is reached at the conference itself . That is to say , even when a controversial matter is dealt with , the most common thing is that it is approved consensually , by a majority of representatives at the conferences .
In short , and as shown in the last quote by the person interviewed , the practice at these conferences legitimizes an institutional leadership of a vertical nature , in which the central administration , acting through the pertinent ministry , acquires a privileged position .
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