European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016 | Page 58

Second Tier, Second Thoughts

of Member States exclusive discretion over
social security design” (EIOPA 2014a,
com. 412). On the opposite side, four
stakeholders associated with the Western
European financial industry (once more
including FSUG) advocate the said 1st
pillar bis passporting as part of a more
closely integrated common financial
market, even though two of them doubt its
feasibility (EIOPA 2014a, com. 397, 401,
403, 404).35

Below the threshold of such
actual market-making, EIOPA also asked
whether PPP customer information ought
to include material on the 1st and 2nd
pillars (Question 44; EIOPA 2013). This
touched a nerve with several stakeholders
as well, since briefing customers about
whole national pension systems and their
future performance in restricted space and
a standardized manner would necessarily
entail an implicit appraisal of member
states’ pension policies. Some opponents
do not welcome this in general, others fear
that might result in biased assessments
(EIOPA 2014a, com. 874, 877, 878, 879,
882, 888).36

the European Parliament, the European
Commission and the Council of Europe
with their distinct chains of democratic
legitimacy. On the other hand, it relies
on the expertise and co-operation of
the member states’ national supervisory
authorities which in turn exercise powers
delegated by national legislative and/or
executive institutions. Additionally, EIOPA
has been keen to communicate with the
European public directly to increase its
input legitimacy, and it clearly strives
to provide services that create output
legitimacy as well. Contrary to Maggetti’s
general claim according to which delegated
regulatory agencies do “not rely on any
kind of representativeness” (Maggetti
2010, 2), EIOPA is clearly interested in the
impression to take on board a representative
array of stakeholder positions. With good
reasons: Taken verbally, EIOPA’s mission
is purely informational. Yet, given the
specific way, it is asked or even pressured
by the Commission to formulate legislative
proposals, its political impact on agendasetting (the vital importance of which
in this very field is stressed by Hennessy
2011) and beyond is potentially much
more powerful. Which, of course, need not
be any less “disquieting in some regards”
(ibid.), among other aspects since “the
normative justification for legitimizing
regulatory governance by independent
agencies is, first and foremost, supposed

4.2 - EIOPA’s Position vis-à-vis the
European Commission, National Regulators

As a European delegated agency,
EIOPA exhibits two doubly indirect links
to voters. On the one hand, it reports to
35

In the financial sector trade unions, pan-European unanimity seems to be greater. Nordic Financial
Unions, an association of Scandinavian trade unions speaking for 150,000 employees, pleads EIOPA
to preserve member states’ specific national three pillar arrangements. Furthermore, it emphasizes the
need to train sales personnel adequately and to remunerate them for selling customers adequate products instead of maximizing turnover (EIOPA 2014a, gen. com. 22). UNI Finance Europe, an umbrella
organization of 320 service sector unions in 50 countries with 7 million members, supports both claims
(EIOPA 2014a, gen. com. 28).
36
Interestingly, this group comprises stakeholders from both sides of the deep divide concerning the
aforementioned issue.
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