European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016 | Page 48

Second Tier, Second Thoughts differences in lobbying strategies. Among, member states, Germany and the United Kingdom account for 15% of stakeholders each, while Southern Europe as well as Central Eastern Europe contribute another 20%, respectively. This is a surprisingly balanced picture, given that the aforementioned public consultation by the European Commission on the Green Paper “Building a Capital Markets Union” was clearly skewed toward the UK financial industry (European Commission 2015c, 3). A balanced distribution of respondents, however, does not guarantee a balanced representation of their views in summary documents. on the 2nd pillar, and now requested counsel on the future regulation of the 3rd, albeit “in close connection with occupational pension schemes because the borderline between personal and occupational pensions is often blurred” (European Commission 2012).12 In 2012, what is now called the 2nd tier was usually termed 28th regime (note that this was before Croatia’s accession as a 28th member state) “whereby EU rules do not replace national rules but are an optional alternative to them” (European Commission 2012), and it was seen as only one part of the single market for personal pensions, the other one being the removal of obstacles for cross-border trade in nationally regulated pension products. By now, the relevant discourse largely centers on the 2nd tier while including major parts of the occupational (2nd pillar) territory. In—somewhat belated, we shall come back to this in Section 4.2—reaction to Faull’s letter, EIOPA published a discussion paper (EIOPA 2013)13 in May 2013, inviting comments from stakeholders within three months and announcing that these comments were to be published. This was duly done in a massive document, EIOPA-TFPP-14-001 (EIOPA 2014a), in January 2014.14 In February 2014, EIOPA drafted a preliminary report to 4.1- What Is at Stake in the 2nd Tier? At first glance, consultatory processes initiated by regulatory agencies may appear to be rather technical, day-today efforts, and, thus, rather un-political. Yet, when the European Commission in the person of Director General Jonathan Faull turned to EIOPA in July 2012 asking for “[t]echnical advice to develop an EU Single Market for personal pension schemes” (European Commission 2012), something way more exciting began. Faull recalled EIOPA’s earlier input regarding the IORP11 Directive, which had focused 11 Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision. For its origins and related power struggles, cf. Haverland (2007), who argues that national pension policy designs account for the preferences not only of member states’ governments, but also of business and members of the European Parliament. Thus, liberalization efforts had limited success here, but business pressure “was sufficient to secure liberal investment principles” (ibid., 886). 12 Faull might have added that this border is not only blurred, but the ambiguous zone is expanding. 13 EIOPA DP-13-001 is also known as EIOPA/13/241; as an institution just gaining its footing, EIOPA was also developing its documentation system gradually. 14 These comments are also available separately. In order to maximize accessibility for our readers, we refer to their location in TFPP-14-001 here. 48