European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016 | Page 48
Second Tier, Second Thoughts
differences in lobbying strategies. Among,
member states, Germany and the United
Kingdom account for 15% of stakeholders
each, while Southern Europe as well
as Central Eastern Europe contribute
another 20%, respectively. This is a
surprisingly balanced picture, given that
the aforementioned public consultation
by the European Commission on the
Green Paper “Building a Capital Markets
Union” was clearly skewed toward the UK
financial industry (European Commission
2015c, 3). A balanced distribution of
respondents, however, does not guarantee
a balanced representation of their views in
summary documents.
on the 2nd pillar, and now requested
counsel on the future regulation of the
3rd, albeit “in close connection with
occupational pension schemes because
the borderline between personal and
occupational pensions is often blurred”
(European Commission 2012).12 In
2012, what is now called the 2nd tier was
usually termed 28th regime (note that
this was before Croatia’s accession as a
28th member state) “whereby EU rules
do not replace national rules but are an
optional alternative to them” (European
Commission 2012), and it was seen as only
one part of the single market for personal
pensions, the other one being the removal
of obstacles for cross-border trade in
nationally regulated pension products. By
now, the relevant discourse largely centers
on the 2nd tier while including major parts
of the occupational (2nd pillar) territory.
In—somewhat belated, we shall
come back to this in Section 4.2—reaction
to Faull’s letter, EIOPA published a
discussion paper (EIOPA 2013)13 in May
2013, inviting comments from stakeholders
within three months and announcing that
these comments were to be published. This
was duly done in a massive document,
EIOPA-TFPP-14-001 (EIOPA 2014a),
in January 2014.14 In February 2014,
EIOPA drafted a preliminary report to
4.1- What Is at Stake in the 2nd Tier?
At first glance, consultatory
processes initiated by regulatory agencies
may appear to be rather technical, day-today efforts, and, thus, rather un-political.
Yet, when the European Commission in
the person of Director General Jonathan
Faull turned to EIOPA in July 2012 asking
for “[t]echnical advice to develop an
EU Single Market for personal pension
schemes” (European Commission 2012),
something way more exciting began. Faull
recalled EIOPA’s earlier input regarding
the IORP11 Directive, which had focused
11
Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision. For its origins and related power struggles, cf.
Haverland (2007), who argues that national pension policy designs account for the preferences not only
of member states’ governments, but also of business and members of the European Parliament. Thus,
liberalization efforts had limited success here, but business pressure “was sufficient to secure liberal
investment principles” (ibid., 886).
12
Faull might have added that this border is not only blurred, but the ambiguous zone is expanding.
13
EIOPA DP-13-001 is also known as EIOPA/13/241; as an institution just gaining its footing, EIOPA
was also developing its documentation system gradually.
14
These comments are also available separately. In order to maximize accessibility for our readers, we
refer to their location in TFPP-14-001 here.
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