European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016 | Page 32
Two Levels, Two Strategies
As shown by the analysis of the
collaboration networks, for instance, most
actors involved in both processes only
seem to be related to their peers (same
actor type) in the respective process. This
is already one strong indicator that they
do not hold enough structural power to
link actions and actors across one or more
subsystems. Typically Economiesuisse,
the SFOE, and the WWF are very central
in the domestic process, but not in the
foreign policy process. In the foreign
process, no actor has significantly high
centralities; and, in general, no actor
seems to be central in both processes
(Figures 1 and 2). There is however, one
exception: the FOEN holds a key position
in both processes. The strong weight of the
federal administration in foreign policy
processes has already been confirmed
by former research (Ingold and Fischer
2014; Sciarini1995), and also here, and
in the case of Copenhagen and Cancun,
the consultation process was rapid and
was heavily controlled by the FOEN. It
is the Minister of the Environment who
arbitrates with the agreement of the
Federal council (government), which
is why the Swiss position remains quite
close to that of FOEN and is characterized
by pro-climate commitments. But even if
FOEN plays the key role in Swiss foreign
climate policy, this cannot be confirmed
for domestic policymaking where other
actors were seen as more powerful.
The international climate change
debate is—mainly through the impact of
the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate
Change (IPCC)—strongly influenced
and designed by scientific actors. Swiss
researchers are well involved within the
IPCC and one would expect that this would
also be reflected in the preparation phase
for the Swiss position in international
climate negotiations. The re-insurance
industry is also greatly interested in policy
outcomes on the foreign policy level: as
an international economic sector strongly
affected by climate change impacts and
natural hazards such as floods and heat
waves, insurance companies have a stake
in the development of international
climate change adaptation measures and
funding. But a strong position of science
and insurance representatives in the
production of the Swiss foreign climate
policy is not visible in our two-level
reputational analysis; and it moreover
seems that neither science nor insurance
industries would be able to bring the
knowledge back into the national climate
policy, as they have, so far, played a
rather peripheral function in the national
decision-making network (see again,
Figures 1 and 2).
We can thus confirm our second
hypothesis and conclude that no actor
has the power or ability to influence
coordinated policy outputs on both levels.
For the test of our third hypothesis,
we investigated whether the same actor
displays different preferences when
acting on two levels. This hypothesis
can also be confirmed. On the national
level , actors were very clear in their
preferences: they were in favor of one
set of policy instruments (incentives)
or the other (voluntary measures). In
Swiss foreign climate policy, preferences
seem harmonized: even actors nationally
against strong mitigation or adaptation
commitments largely supported the
instrument mix suggested by the Swiss
government. In national policymaking,
conflict about policy design is high,
because of potential target groups, that is,
actors who have to pay or to implement
future policy instruments, lobby against
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