European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016 | Page 24

Two Levels, Two Strategies

All of the authors emphasize the
from the fact that very few actors
crucial role of actors participating in
have the power and ability to link
several processes and on different levels.
both processes and thus influence
Thus, the absence of such actors might be
coordinated policy outputs on the
one explanatory factor for the production
two levels.
of divergent outcomes and outputs of
two-level games. From this, we deduce
A political subsystem or domain is
our first hypothesis:
characterized by actors who defend their
preferences or interests in order to impact
H1: The difference in policy policy outputs (Knoke and Laumann
outputs between the national policy 1982; Sabatier and Weible 2007). From a
formulation and the position within game theoretical point of view, however,
international negotiations stems actors may adapt their action decisions
from the fact that hardly any actors and preferences depending on the interest
simultaneously participate in both they have in the game-related issue, as
policy processes.
well as the institutional and contextual
settings at stake (Dutton, Schneider, and

However, if we did find evidence Vedel 2012). We thus conclude with our
of actors participating in both processes, third hypothesis stating that:
they might suffer from the burden of
two-level accountability: toward both
H3: The difference in policy
domestic citizens and international peers
outputs between the national policy
(Papadopoulos 2010). Actors that are
formulation and the position within
capable of harmonizing domestic and
international negotiations stems
foreign policy outputs may thus possess
from the fact that the same actor
high levels of power in order to do this.
participating in both processes
In their seminal work, Stokman and
defends very divergent preferences
Zeggelink (1996) differentiate between
and interests on the two levels.
two dimensions to be taken into account
when assessing policy actors’ political
As a first step, we thus focus on
power: their ability to influence and actors participating in both processes.
access decision making, as well as the Once we find evidence for that (and thus
resources at their disposal. Diverging potentially rejected our first hypothesis),
outputs on both levels thus allow us to we then investigate the power structures
assume that there are no such actors and policy preferences of those actors.
holding sufficient political power to
coordinate policy outputs on both levels.
From those insights, we deduce our Case and Methods
second hypothesis.
he global climate regime is
H2: The difference in policy
characterized by horizontal and
outputs between the national policy
vertical fragmentations where
formulation and the position within different state and nonstate actors
international negotiations stems

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