European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016 | Page 156

Knowing the Future: Theories of Time in Policy Analysis

making procedures. Instead of problem
solving, the best actors can do is using trialand-error procedures. Choice is made not
on a rational basis but as spontaneous
selection from a fluid and incalculable
stream of events. Sometimes, this strategy
of “temporal sorting” means searching a
problem for an already available solution.
Time is scarce and so is attention.

In contrast to the first group of
theories, rationality is bounded because
of limited cognitive and organizational
resources (Kahneman 2011; Simon
1982). More importantly, problems,
solutions, and politics flow more or less
independently of each other like streams
of events, regardless of the policy agenda
or the strategies of actors. Sometimes, an
opportunity window opens up and can be
used to couple problems, solutions, and/
or politics. It all comes down the right
timing. The capability of political action
depends on different zones of attentions,
much like Schütz has described them:
“There is a relatively small kernel that is
clear, distinct and consistent in itself. This
kernel is surrounded by zones of various
gradations of vagueness, obscurity, and
ambiguity. There follow zones of things
just taken for granted, blind beliefs, bare
suppositions, mere guesswork […]. And
finally, there are regions of our complete
ignorance” (1959, 78). Ambiguity and
ignorance are high.

Under these circumstances, the
main mode of political action is temporal
manipulation (Zahariadis 2003, 14–16;
2015). The presentations of problems as
being urgent, the use of symbols such
as a burning flag to raise awareness,
“salami tactics” to enable sequential
decision making, or the acceleration of
procedures help to focus debates and
move them into a desired direction. In

his analysis of deadlines, Zahariadis has
shown that delimiting time horizons
tends to dramatically change the temporal
rhythm of the policy process. Deadlines
are not politically neutral. Instead, they
are “political devices” changing the
long-term orientation of policymakers
while accelerating decision making. By
inducing an artificial termination, they
reduce political conflicts, facilitate a
more innovative and uninhibited policy
style—but may also lead to a decrease
in participation and to less democratic
dynamics of exclusion (Zahariadis 2015).

For all these reasons, theories of
policymaking by time tend to be skeptical
about knowing the future. Under
conditions of ambiguity, knowledge
about the future may change at every
moment. Policymakers carry on in an
incremental fashion, aiming at taking
their opportunities for both attention and
action as the policy stream goes on.

5. Times of Policymaking

A

third group of theories of
time is inspired by pragmatist
interpretations of time and the
sociology of knowledge and culture
(Berger and Luckmann 1967; Elias 1984;
Nowotny 1994). It builds on William James’
(1890) distinction between “knowledge
about” and “knowledge of acquaintance”,
a basic difference also for Schütz who
makes use of it in his constitutional theory
of social reality (1959, 78). In modern
societies, much knowledge is derived not
from immediate observation but through
highly objectified, shared systems of
sense-making imposed on us by others in
societal interactions (Schütz 1976; Srubar
1988).

156