European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016 | Page 151

European Policy Analysis

whether Tiresias’ knowledge about
the future is in fact fragmentary and
selective. How does this “mechanism of
selection” work? Does the seer experience
the future as an ongoing stream of events
with an open horizon? Does that mean
that the prophecy is always also a kind
of prognosis anticipating what follows
beyond this horizon? Or is Tiresias
capable of selecting and seeing certain
events as if they had already happened?
“Neither assumption however explains
what motivates Tiresias to select this and
that particular moment […] Moreover,
neither assumption explains why Tiresias”
knowledge of the future, as in the case of
his forecast of Odysseus’ homecoming, is
either fragmentary of heterogeneous…’
(1959, 75). In taking the mythical figure
of Tiresias as a starting point, Schütz
applies these questions to the mortals
of the lifeworld (1959, 77). How do we
form anticipations of future events? Why
are they relevant to us? In which ways
do they determine our plans, projects,
and motives? Answers to these questions
are of fundamental importance. They
provide insights into the problems and
dilemmas of predicting the future. As
Schütz, in criticizing Weber, had already
made clear, anticipating a future in which
one’s own acts are already accomplished
is the very moment that defines action
and distinguishes it from mere behavior
(Schütz 1974).

This article focuses on theories of
time in policy analysis. It is being argued
that existing concepts can be compared in
terms of how they answer (implicitly or
explicitly) Schütz’ questions on knowing
the future. Firstly, approaches analyzing
policymaking in terms of cycles,
sequences, or temporalities emphasize
the influence of a “preorganized” stock of

knowledge and norms (1959, 77, 76) as
constraint and resource of political action.
Secondly, conceptions of policy as a stream
of events are concerned with the relevance
structures and temporal selections of
policymaking as it is confronted with
ambiguity in every moment of action.
A third group of theories analyzes the
cultural and communicative construction
of time in policy processes and inquires on
how, in turn, these collectively validated
understandings realign the time horizons
of past, present, and future.

In giving a critical overview on
these various theories and concepts,
the article is based on two central
assumptions: The various ways time is
conceptualized are closely related to
underlying understandings of politics
and political action. Theories of time are
also always political theories. Debating
time is thus not only of analytic value
but it also has large implications on
how power, rationality, and collectivity
are related to each other. Moreover
and probably less obvious, theories of
time as political theories can be highly
influential in practice. When they find
their way into policymaking and become
what Helga Nowotny has once called
“chronotechnologies”, they may realign
the time horizons of political action. Just
like Tiresias in his answer to Odysseus,
they reveal only a fragment of how we can
know the future and, as a consequence,
may therefore determine the actual
experience of and the decisions upon
future events. Thus, theories of time are
not only political theories but also a form
of political practice. Tiresias, it turns out,
is all but an “impotent onlooker”. This
communicative dimension of knowing
the future is something Schütz might
have underestimated.

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