European Gaming Lawyer magazine Autumn 2015 | Page 13

in exceptional circumstances, such as where
a fundamental right of an individual or an
entity has been engaged.

gambling”. Accordingly, he refused to
enforce the order in respect of the gambling
debt in the sum of EUR €118,000.

Decision
Mr Justice MacEochaidh, at the High Court,
allowed the appeal of the defendant against
recovery of the gambling debt (the first
judgment), but not in respect of the costs
of the proceedings incurred by the plaintiff
(the second judgment).

(ii) Enforcement of the Costs Order
The Court took a different view of the
second judgment, concerning the costs
incurred by the plaintiff in seeking to
enforce the gambling debt. Mr Justice
MacEochaidh did not regard that order as
constituting enforcement of a gambling
debt, as the monies were not owed from a
betting transaction, but rather concerned
litigation expenses only. Therefore he held
that the costs order in the sum of STG
£17,500 was enforceable under the Brussels
Regulation.

(i) Recovery of the Gambling Debt
The Court held that enforcing the first
judgment would have the effect of enforcing
a gambling debt in the State. Mr Justice
MacEochaidh found that in assessing the
extent to which public policy in a Member
State must be offended so as to disallow
enforcement, the case law has consistently
stated that the infringement “must constitute
a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded
as essential in the legal order of the state
in which enforcement is being sought.” He
noted that he did not read the dicta of
Ms Justice Dunne in Emo Oil as meaning
that the public policy exception may only
be invoked if the foreign trial breached
fundamental rights.
The Court held that there was a manifest
conflict between the foreign court order
arising from the gambling debt and Irish
public policy as expressed in the 1956
statute. Mr Justice MacEochaidh stated that:
“The rule reflects public policy on the control
of gambling. It is an essential measure in
as much as the Oireachtas has considered
it necessary for the purposes of controlling

Comment
This decision shows that the public policy
ground for refusing recognition of a foreign
judgment will be interpreted strictly by the
courts, otherwise there is a risk of defeating
the purpose of the Brussels Regulation.
The Irish courts will only allow the public
policy ground to be invoked where there is a
manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as
essential in Ireland.
This is an important judgment for the
gaming industry, particularly in light of the
rise in operators operating across multiple
jurisdictions in the EU via the internet.
The implications of the judgment may be
said to be two-fold;
•
It reinforces the existing prohibition
on the enforcement of ‘gaming and
wagering contracts’ in section 36 of the
1956 Act; and

•

It ensures that should a gambling debt
arise in respect of an Irish domiciled
customer and a foreign operator, such
a foreign operator will not be able to
enforce the debt against the Irishdomiciled customer in Ireland, even
if judgment is successfully obtained in
another Member State.

Whilst public policy appears to be framed
to discourage gambling and wagering,
it is questionable whether or not this
public policy is in keeping with recent
developments in Irish gambling law and,
in particular, the introduction of the
Betting (Amendment) Act, 2015. This
Act requires all offshore bookmakers who
accept bets from Irish customers to obtain
an Irish bookmakers’ licence. If the policy
is to require offshore operators to obtain
an Irish licence, it seems inconsistent for
public policy to then fail to take account of
the commercial realities of the market by
not allowing operators the opportunity to
enforce gambling debts, particularly if an
enforcement order is obtained in another
jurisdiction.

For further information, please
contact one of the A&L Goodbody
Betting & Gaming team, Joe Kelly,
Partner, jkelly@algoodbody.
com or Máire Conneely, Senior
Associate, mconneely@
algoodbody.com

European Gaming Lawyer | Autumn Issue | 2015 | 13