Diplomatist Magazine DIplomatist September 2018

REGIONAL COOPERATION an acknowledgment of growing Chinese maritime inﬂ uence in East and South China Seas and reducing American involvement in the region, Japan underwent foreign and security policy reforms after December 2013. In 2014, Japan gradually elevated their long-standing friendship to strategic partnership with Sri Lanka. The maritime cooperation iii can be seen as twofold — ﬁ rstly providing assistance for capacity building in the maritime safety for enforcing maritime law, mitigating disasters risks, conducting Search and Rescue operations, providing grant- in-aid for patrol vessels, and so on. On the other hand, the two countries initiated close cooperation and exchanges between the navies and the coast guards iv by regular port calls as a means to enhancing maritime security. The two countries engage in training and bilateral as well multilateral exercises for the skill development of Sri Lankan Navy and Coast Guards. Sri Lanka’s Dilemma The maritime relationship between Japan and Sri Lanka has fructiﬁ ed due to complementarities in interests. The mutual beneﬁ cial relation, however, has some moot points for Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), to which both are members. Like Japan, India too, is wary of Chinese military indiscretions in the Indian Ocean. Conversely, India shares warm diplomatic and military relations with Japan that is visible in their commitment to bilateral v and multilateral defence exercises such as Malabar, conception of inter-regional infrastructure, and connectivity projects like Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. Therefore, managing maritime relations with India, Japan, and China will be walking a tightrope for Sri Lanka. Future Trends in Maritime Diplomacy As a stakeholder in Indian Ocean affairs, Sri Lanka has taken a zealous role in the regional platform. The country vi seeks to build multilateral and multi-stakeholder platforms to promote stronger maritime engagements in an inclusive and rules-based mechanism between Indian Ocean powers to increase dividends from economic, political, and security relations. These ambitions align perfectly with Japan’s own vision to secure the Indian Ocean leg of the sea lanes of communication under FOIP. Though India does not have a nuanced Indo-Paciﬁ c strategy, its vision for peaceful and India shares warm diplomatic and military relations with Japan that is visible in their commitment to bilateral and multilateral defence exercises such as Malabar, conception of inter-regional infrastructure, and connectivity projects like Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. Sri Lanka. As the island nation is dependent on its maritime assets for its development, the same beneﬁ ts come with riders. The leasing out of its Hambantota port to China for 99 years due to inability to repay the Chinese loan is now dissuading the country from putting all the eggs in one basket. It is now diversifying its bilateral relations as well as economy by inviting more countries to develop its ports and maritime infrastructure. Japan’s interest in the east-coast situated, deep-water Trincomalee port is one such example. Colombo’s relationship with New Delhi is still cold despite their 30 nautical miles distance. The itchy subjects between India and Sri Lanka such as ﬁ shermen’s dispute, maritime boundary delimitation and more importantly, the ethnic Tamil-Sinhalese issue in Sri Lanka has driven the island country into China’s arms. It is also Indian foreign policy indiscretion that allowed its neighbours to trust and seek diplomatic and ﬁ nancial support from countries like China over the past few decades. With India’s renewed emphasis on engaging with its Eastern neighbours (Act East policy) and through the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), the focus is back to the IOR. This provides both India and Sri Lanka to seek avenues of maritime engagements within the existing frameworks of prosperous Indian Ocean is crystal clear. As Sri Lanka seeks its role in the Indian Ocean policy shaping, it has to maneuver all these regional aspirations while managing its domestic vision of maritime safety and security. References: i http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1114280.shtml ii https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/08/08/ commentary/japan-commentary/japan-emerging-indo- pacifi c-strategy/#.W6MuvCQzbIV iii https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/15/national/ politics-diplomacy/japan-sri-lanka-agree-promote- maritime-security-cooperation/#.W6MyFSQzbIU iv http://www.asiantribune.com/node/90350 v https://timesofi ndia.indiatimes.com/india/india-japan- to-expand-defence-ties-to-hold-fi rst-joint-army-exercise- this-year/articleshow/65476128.cms vi http://www.ft.lk/front-page/PM-fl oats-new-platform-by- SL-for-Indian-Ocean-maritime-cooperation/44-661794 *Pooja Bhatt is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi. She is also a PhD candidate at the School of International Studies, JNU. Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 6 • Issue 9 • September 2018, Noida • 49

Diplomatist Magazine DIplomatist September 2018 | Page 49