Diplomatist Magazine DIplomatist September 2018 | Page 48

REGIONAL COOPERATION
T
he Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is ‘the geopolitical
hotspot’ where bilateral relations are currently being
shaped and reshaped. However, the contours of the
current relationship will be fashioned by the ongoing regional
developments, as well as the degree of convergence in their
individual objectives – both which are based on their domestic
as well as foreign policy pressings. The visit of Japanese
Defence Minister, Itsunori Onedera, to Sri Lanka in August
2018 in this context (though it cannot be termed as unique
or fi rst time even in their bilateral accord) implies that there
is a fresh impetus from the both parties to strengthen their
maritime ties. The onus is on Sri Lanka to carefully maneuver
its relations with Japan for larger peace and stability of the
IOR while maintaining its relationship with several powers,
accommodating parallel infrastructure development and
security aims for the region.
Overlapping Projects in the Indian Ocean Region
The Indian Ocean Region has evolved into a striking
maritime space with multitudes of issues, convergences of
interests as well as clashes of geopolitical aspirations of
individual states. The security threats to humans, energy, food
and other crucial resources etc. loom large; nonetheless, there
is still lack of larger common vision between the countries
and stakeholders in the Indian Ocean to address the issues
without exacerbating or fuelling any further tensions. The
conundrum gets worse for the smaller economies of the
region that seek investment and infrastructure building (as
a road to prosperity) but have to walk a thin line when the
bigger powers come expressing their interests in doing so.
Several of these powers like China-Japan, China-USA, and
even China-US do not sit comfortably with each other and
hence are competing with each other on the projects such as
building regional bilateral trade, economic endeavors, and
infrastructure development. The issues mutate pensively as
soon as any military or strategic angle is attached to it.
Bilateral Relations - A Zero Sum Game?
At best Sri Lanka’s attempt to invite several regional
powers for investment and development of facilities such as
ports, equipment, and training for its naval forces and Coast
Guards cannot and should not be seen as a zero-sum game
by onlookers. As on date, several countries are eyeing for
intra-regional connectivity and infrastructure development
projects such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
that expands from Western Pacifi c Ocean to Eastern Indian
Ocean. Similarly, Japan and the US show their interests in the
larger normative framework of ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c’
along with India and Australia. However,
Chinese scholars view this as a military
alliance to counter the BRI i . The two
frameworks overlap geographically in
the IOR. In other words, what Colombo
sees as a window of growth has actually
become a geopolitical chess between
several countries and source of tension
within the region.
Tokyo’s Maritime Approach to
Indian Ocean
Japan’s interest in the Indian Ocean
is owing to the country’s dependence
on accessing energy resources of the
West Asian countries through the sea
lanes. Ensuring energy security requires
maritime awareness of these lanes and
the capability to address challenges
that exist there, say for example piracy.
China’s aggressive yet obscure maritime
position vis-à-vis its statements and behaviour in the East and
South China Sea, coupled with military activities as far as in
Indian Ocean and Djibouti, has forced Japan into revising ii
its maritime strategies and building partnerships.
Japan’s relationship with Sri Lanka can be dated back
to when Colombo helped Tokyo in the latter’s assimilation
with the international community, post its First World War
debacle, and after calling for Treaty of San Francisco in
1952. But the maritime engagement between the two was
lacking due to Japan’s own pacifi c military doctrine and
the US’ umbrella protection. This, however, changed with
a realisation that the East-West shipping lane serving Japan
lies only 12 nautical miles from the island country, as well as
the presence of several strategically located deep water ports
like Trincomalee and Hambantota in the Indian Ocean. With
48 • Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 6 • Issue 9 • September 2018, Noida