COVER STORY
peace? As Ralph Hawtrey has aptly concluded: “If war is an
interruption between two periods of peace, it is equally true
that peace is an interval between two wars.”
Naturally, other related questions arise – have we put
the threat of a large-scale global war behind us forever? Or
are we nearing another great war? These questions have
haunted thinkers time and time again, especially after the
Second World War. Unfortunately, historical forces being
unique, complex, and contextual, fail to give us any clear
answers or an accurate system of predictive analysis. No
grand theory has been successful in explaining the forces of
war and peace and all the analytical tools that we have are
a set of near theses and a multitude of hypotheses. Yet, with
the rise of China as a global force and the ostensible decline
of the hegemony of United States, we are yet again haunted
by these eternal questions. 1
Hegemonic Wars
If George Modelski (1978) is to be believed, then we are
perhaps somewhere near an impending global crisis as he
professed in his theory of "long cycles of global politics" that
there are hundred-year long cycles which begin and end with
“global wars”. Indeed, the fi rst world war was an inauguration
of such a cycle which triggered a greater collapse of global
peace and coordination in the form of the second world war,
after which the world has managed a relative period of long-
standing peace. The changing of the international system is
yet again in near sight as the United States shows signs of
closing up, perhaps signaling its withdrawal from the position
of world leadership; and as the Pax-Americana is gesturing a
conclusion, China is at its gates attempting to assert itself by
fi lling up the political and economic space laying its claim
to reshape the international order.
Ephemeral Peace
In a hegemonic struggle, peaceful settlements seem hardly
likely and game theory helps us understand why. Even though
peaceful resolution of a hegemonic struggle is perhaps the
most optimally benefi cial course of action for all nations,
it is hardly likely especially in the presence of a number of
states. There is always a looming possibility that a declining
hegemon will end up in a confl ict situation with at least one
state in its phase of decline and this would most likely be
enough to precipitate a large scale war. Yet in game theoretic
terms war rather than peaceful settlement turns out to be a
Nash equilibrium, albeit suboptimal. In fact, it may, in many
cases be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
Even with treaties of cooperation, the danger that the other
state would try to defect and begin to occupy a larger share
is always around the corner. One can always reassert power
and infl uence, even if it is a hegemon in decline given that it
gets enough breathing space and some stability. Similarly, a
rising hegemon can accommodate with the erstwhile one, but
its motivations to press on harder to seek favorable terms and
to eventually dominate are ever present. Therefore, stability of
cooperation is at best, weak. Hence, the set of strategies which
is evolutionarily stable is where both states defect. Once this
happens, there is no incentive for either state to change their
strategy and pursue peace since it reduces their payoff s and
can even lead to their annihilation. War therefore, becomes a
Nash equilibrium – a likely end state - even though collective
benefi ts are greater when both play the peace strategy.
Yet peace does happen. When war ends up in the defeat of
one state which may cause its annexation, annihilation, or a
step short of it with severe penalties on the defeated state - as
was the case with the post fi rst World War Germany. Peace
also happens when two states resolve hegemonic transfer
peacefully as was the case between Britain and the United
States. As the realist Gilpin has profoundly noted:
“Although men desire peace, it is not their highest value. If
it were, peace and peaceful change could easily be achieved;
a people need only refuse to defend itself. Throughout history,
however, societies have placed other values and interests
above their desire for peace. From this perspective the
basic task of peaceful change is not merely to secure peace;
it is to foster change and achieve a peace that secures one's
basic values. Determining how this goal is to be achieved in
specifi c historical circumstances is the ultimate task of wise
and prudent statesmanship.”
He adds that “in the absence of shared values and interests,
the mechanism of peaceful change has little chance of
success.”
It is in this last statement that perhaps some answers
to the questions we started with lie. In my experience of
studying inter-group confl icts, I studied hundreds of cases of
caste and religion-based violence in India. Indeed, working
at the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and the
National Foundation for Communal Harmony exposed me
In the backdrop of these questions, it is prudent to declare at the outset that this paper is an attempt to make sense of some of the prevalent
hypotheses in relation to how the world is changing and what we can do about it, rather than professing any general laws or a grand theory,
which inevitably would be a futile exercise. Also, it must be here acknowledged that I have heavily depended and have been infl uenced by
the realist school of thought, especially the works of thinkers such as Robert Gilpin, E.H. Carr, Kenneth Waltz, and Jonathan Kirshner
among many others.
1
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 6 • Issue 10 • Oct-Nov 2018, Noida • 31