INSIDE EUROPE
BUDAPEST’S BETRAYAL
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its Legacy
BY MARK DUNCAN*
O
n a quiet afternoon on 23 October, tens of thousands
of Hungarians – lead mostly by students and
writers – converged on Bem Square in Budapest to
demonstrate in solidarity with striking workers in Poland.
Few would have conceived that this initially peaceful protest
would rapidly escalate into civil war, revolution and resistance
against Soviet invasion, leaving over 2,000 Hungarians dead
and a futher 200,000 displaced as refugees. The Hungarian
Revolution would ignite and fi zzle within only 12 days, yet
it had seismic consequences for Europe as well as the world.
When the uprising began, Hungary’s Communist regime
had only held undisputed power for seven years. Starting from
a position of relative weakness, the Communists employed
the so-called “salami” strategy to gradually slice up their
opposition. The General Secretary of the Hungarian Working
People’s Party (MDP), Mátyás Rákosi, remained paranoid
about potential dissent; the State Protection Authority (ÁVH)
kept tabs on over one million Hungarians, and several former
stars of the Party (including the ÁVH’s founder, László Rajk)
were condemned to death at show trials. Meanwhile, the
Hungarian economy groaned under the weight of post-war
reparations to the Soviet bloc, whilst the prioritisation of
heavy industry under the Stalinist development model lead
to a scarcity of consumer goods and foodstuff s.
Instead of off ering political stability, the Communists’
consolidation of power soon descended into a high-stakes
game of musical chairs. After the death of Soviet premier Josef
Stalin in 1953, Moscow curbed Rákosi’s power by forcing
him to resign as general secretary in favour of Imre Nagy.
The latter embarked upon a reformist agenda that proved
intolerable to MDP hard-liners, who engineered Rákosi’s
return to full power in 1955. But year later, the eventual victor
in the Soviet power struggle, Nikita Khrushchev, denounced
Stalin in his infamous ‘Secret Speech’, providing the pretext
for Nagy to once more replace Rákosi (who self-described as
“Stalin’s best pupil”). By October, Hungary had the perfect
conditions for civil confl ict: a disunited elite, a troubled
economy and a heavy-handed police state.
18 • Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 6 • Issue 10 • Oct-Nov 2018, Noida