Diplomatist Magazine Diplomatist March 2019 | Page 39

GLOBAL CENTRE STAGE
METHODS OF WALKING OUT
THE SECOND
TRUMP-KIM SUMMIT
BY DR. BINOY KAMPMARK*
U
S President Donald Trump, in a seemingly abrupt
conclusion to talks in Hanoi with North Korea at
the end of February, formulated this reasoning:
“Sometimes you have to walk and this was one of those
times.” North Korea’s Kim Jong-un had been pressing his
advantage in Hanoi with an attempt to convince Trump that
sanctions needed to be eased. He ended up seeing the back
of Trump after the appropriate handshakes, a few nods, and
a general acceptance that there will be more in the way of
conversation in future months.
The loose drama at such events is often hard to detach
from the fi rmly rooted substance. The appearance tends to
precede the substantive value of what transpired. Ahead of
the meeting, the White House was busy sending various
signals designed to baffl e and confuse friend and foe alike.
The president was keen to praise the “special relationship”
with Kim, the sort of term reserved for gatherings such as
those between the UK and US.
At the end of January, Stephen Biegun, designated special
representative for North Korea in the US State Department,
suggested that Pyongyang had made a commitment in pre-
summit talks to eliminate uranium and plutonium enrichment
facilities for a price. He seemed confi dent that matters were
moving on in Pyongyang. His mood seemed to jar with the
more bellicose stance taken by national security adviser and
pro-bombing enthusiast John R. Bolton and fellow belligerent
companion and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. In this,
the Trump administration was being orthodox in unorthodoxy:
playing its dysfunction and diff erences in full view.
In carefully chosen words, Beigun noted how “Chairman
Kim qualified next steps on North Korea’s plutonium
and uranium enrichment facilities upon the United States
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 7 • Issue 3 • March 2019, Noida • 39