Diplomatist Magazine Diplomatist July 2018 | Page 51

AFRICA DIARY
On 20 June 2018, during the commemoration of
Eritrea’s National Martyrs Day, President Isaias Afewerki
announced that his country was sending a delegation
to the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, to work towards
establishing lasting peace between the two countries.
trench warfare of World War I and partly based on a dispute
over the precise location of extensive parts of the boundary
separating the countries, led to the death of tens of thousands
on both sides (it is estimated that Eritrea lost about 19,000
soldiers, while Ethiopia’s losses are estimated at between
70,000-130,000 soldiers), the separation of families, friends,
and communities, large-scale displacement of civilians, the
widespread destruction of infrastructure, and cost billions of
dollars. The confl ict also severed the two countries’ strong
economic, social, cultural, and security relations.
By June 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the Agreement
on Cessation of Hostilities in Algiers, and then in December
2000, Eritrea President Isaias Afewerki and Ethiopia’s-then
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi signed the Algiers Peace
Agreement. Inter-alia, the agreement called for both parties
to permanently terminate hostilities and refrain from the
threat or use of force, and established an independent and
impartial Boundary Commission to delimit and demarcate
borders. Subsequently, in 2001, the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary
Commission (EEBC) was formally established and, after
a lengthy investigation and litigation process, it rendered
its decisions on 13 April 2002 at the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague.
The EEBC and “No Peace, No War”
While the process and decisions were meant to settle
the dispute, the two countries remained on a war footing,
described as “no peace, no war”. The EEBC ruling presented
both Eritrea and Ethiopia with gains and losses; however, one
of the EEBC’s most signifi cant decisions saw the casus belli
of the 1998-2000 war, the small rural border town of Badme,
awarded to Eritrea. Although Eritrea accepted the EEBC’s
decisions in their entirety and generally sought to uphold the
integrity of the Algiers Peace Agreement, Ethiopia refused
to accept the outcome and completely failed to abide by its
international legal obligations and responsibilities. Instead,
it sought to obstruct or reverse the EEBC’s decisions and
continued to militarily occupy large swathes of Eritrean
territory, including Badme.
Additionally, the two countries engaged in proxy confl icts
with periods of open skirmishes and hostilities, and they also
began supporting and hosting rebel opposition movements
against each other. In 2009, under the pretext of its alleged
support for Somali Islamist terrorists, Eritrea was placed
under intern