Diplomatist Magazine Diplomatist July 2018 | Page 41

SPOTLIGHT
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has shown his political will
to enhance India’s global engagements through frequent and
sustained interactions with all global powers. The topmost
priority has been accorded to Indo-US ties in terms of great
power diplomacy. As the world's two largest democracies,
India’s and America’s core security interests show far more
signifi cant points of overlap than of divergence. American
recognition of India as a ‘major defence partner’ can allow
New Delhi to buy more advanced and sensitive technologies
from Washington. The latest US offer to sell the armed version
of Guardian drones to India is a case in point. If concluded
successfully, it will be the fi rst time that the US would have
sold a large armed drone to a country outside the NATO.
Furthermore, the US supports India’s claim for a permanent
seat at the UN Security Council and its entry into the NSG.
Although India seeks to check Pakistani belligerence by
leveraging the US in South Asia, and balance China’s growing
infl uence by strengthening strategic cooperation with the US
in the Indo-Pacifi c region, New Delhi has so far avoided being
drawn into an alliance-like relationship with Washington.
It is pertinent to mention here that the Asian continent has
continued to witness strong tendencies towards multipolarity,
and this is nothing new. The inherent multipolar tendencies
in the region were demonstrated by the strategies adopted
by India and China when they became independent. Beijing
showed the capacity of non-commitment rather than accepting
the constraining bipolar logic of the Cold War. After an initial
alignment with the Soviet Union, China decided to break
away and drew closer to the US. After the disintegration of
the Soviet Union, when concerns about unipolarity rose, China
opted to establish a partnership with Russia. On the other hand,
India deviated from its ‘non-aligned’ stance to seek American
military aid when China attacked India in 1962, and again
when it built a de-facto alliance with Russia. Following the
end of the Cold War, India began to forge a close partnership
with the US, even as it sought proximity with Russia and China
in the name of promoting multipolarity.
In other words, even when aligned with one or the other
superpower, both India and China have been averse to
abandoning their strategic autonomy. As they become stronger
and develop the capabilities to infl uence their environment
in the Indo-Pacifi c region, India and China are more likely to
emphasise their own independent role than to accept positions
subordinate to other powers. This is why, despite being ‘a
virtual American ally’, India is reluctant to become ‘a formal
American ally’. And this reluctance stems from a long tradition
in Indian foreign policy to maintain the independence of its
strategic decision-making.
India’s strategic response to China’s unprecedented rise is
refl ected in its balancing strategy, as seen in its main strategic
partnerships with the US, Japan and Russia. Though the
Indo–US strategic partnership tops the list, India has also
cultivated a ‘special and privileged partnership’ with Russia
and a ‘strategic and global partnership’ with Japan. India
recognises that Japan has much to offer as an ally because of its
need to counter China’s growing regional dominance. Further,
American President Donald Trump’s repeated use of the term
‘Indo-Pacifi c’ instead of ‘Asia-Pacifi c’ is a clear indicator
that the Trump administration is keen to block China’s bid to
dominate Asian geopolitics with India’s help.
It is important to note, however, that the ramifi cations
of closer interactions between India and the US, as well as
the widening rift between the US and Russia, are being felt
in India–Russia relations. How New Delhi and Washington
relate to a power that the Indians perceive as friendly and
cooperative but which the Americans see in a different light,
has put India in a diffi cult position. Moscow remains New
Delhi’s most important defence partner, and is perceived as
India’s traditional friend. However, India’s growing defence
ties with the US have led to a trust defi cit between India and
Russia.
India, however, continues to prominently fi gure in Russia’s
geopolitical schemes as part of the RIC, BRICS and SCO.
Between India and Russia, there are some specifi c areas of
convergence and meeting of minds which can be witnessed
on many issues. But areas of disagreement and the lack of
robust civil society engagement are worrying signals. The
consequences of Russia’s outreach to Pakistan have been
both symbolic and substantive. Further, Moscow's slow
but steady drift towards the strategic embrace of Beijing is
detrimental for India. New Delhi’s diplomatic challenge, thus,
lies in balancing India’s interests between the India–Russia–
China triangle and the India-US-Japan-Australia maritime
Quadrilateral.
After their ‘informal summit’ in Sochi in May, Modi and
President Putin provided guidelines for the development
of a ‘special privileged strategic partnership’. The growing
protectionism and unpredictability of the current US
administration is a factor in India’s efforts to reset ties with
Russia. While India continues to open up its defence market to
Western suppliers, important purchases such as the acquisition
of the S-400 missile defence system have been given a go
ahead despite the threat of American sanctions under the
‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act’
(CAATSA). It indicates that India is not going to allow its
defence engagement with Russia to be dictated by any other
country. This should reassure Russia that it will remain India's
biggest su pplier of military hardware for the foreseeable
future.
The growth of naval forces in the Indo-Pacifi c region
has the potential to cause tensions, but they also provide
opportunity for greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation
in maritime security. For instance, the emergence of Indonesia
as a strong partner for India augurs well for regional security.
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 6 • Issue 7 • July 2018, Noida • 41