COUNTRY FOCUS
DUTCH COURAGE
IS THE NETHERLANDS OVERCONFIDENT
IN ITS EU INFLUENCE?
BY JOSEF JANNING*
S
hould you be searching for a strong case of the
power of smaller states in the European Union, look
no further: the Netherlands is the best example of
a country punching above its economic or demographic
weight. And this is in spite of its reluctance towards a more
profound integration. The Netherlands has the sixth largest
economy in the EU, ranks seventh in defence spending, and
is eighth in population size. But the Dutch come in fourth
out of 28 – behind only Germany, France, and Italy – in
terms of relevance as measured by ECFR’s EU Coalition
Explorer, even though their (and Italy’s) commitment to
deeper integration is generally viewed to be the weakest of
the founding EU members.
Policymakers and planners in The Hague currently
have cause to review their country’s place and role in its
interactions with member states. After all, Brexit means
that an important ally and like-minded partner on issues
ranging from security to trade is leaving the bloc. For Dutch
diplomacy, this implies a growing dependence on its closest
partner, Germany. Relations with Berlin are already crucial
to Dutch EU policymaking. As the Coalition Explorer shows,
the ties between both countries are mutually strong — for
Germany, the Netherlands is its most important EU partner
after France. Relying on that link alone, however, could be
too narrow a base to satisfy the traditional inclination of the
Dutch political class to balance its relations with Germany
— and, on top of that, to achieve some counterweight to the
Franco-German axis. Close ties with Britain have served that
purpose well over many years, even though the British opt-
outs from the euro and Schengen already weakened London’s
weight in the balance. Furthermore, a reliance on Germany
alone could devalue the bilateral link in the eyes of Berlin — a
close partner with additional options would certainly count
more than one without such alternatives.
With Britain out, the Netherlands will want to develop
alternative options. If the Franco-German tandem cannot be
balanced without Britain, then possibly a closer relationship
with France might achieve something in the Dutch interest.
Getting one’s interests recognised in Paris, and being seen
as a valuable partner there, could help to secure the Dutch
position. An analysis of the interaction preferences of both
countries shows the current weakness of this link. When it
comes to the density of contact between the two, The Hague’s
focus on Paris is strong (weaker only than that on Germany
and Belgium), but the French response is weak. However, on
shared interest and responsiveness, the relationship between
the Netherlands and France is insignifi cant — it does not
show up in the list of Dutch preferred partners at all. While
Paris — and Berlin — view The Hague as among the top fi ve
most infl uential EU member states in general, at 7 percent
respective readings for both countries are slightly lower than
that of all capitals taken together (9 percent). They are also
signifi cantly lower than the self-assessment of the Dutch
professional class, which sees their country at 15 percent.
On the upside, the French view the Netherlands as the
most infl uential among the highly affl uent smaller member
states of the EU: the Benelux countries, the Nordic countries,
and Austria. Thus, in the lead of closer cooperation between
these countries, and possibly adding others such as Ireland,
Portugal, the Baltics, or Slovenia, the Dutch role could grow
10 • Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 7 • Issue 4 • April-May 2019, Noida