Diplomatist Magazine Diplomatist Oct-Nov 2018 | Page 9

Erdogan opened his speech with condolences to not just the family and friends of the Saudi journalist, but to the ‘media world’ as well. This is ironic coming from the leader of a government that has imprisoned more journalists than any other place in the world. coalition against Shia Iran. Erdogan’s animosity toward Riyadh is driven by radically diff erent perspectives on the role of Islam in the future of the Middle East. He is a deeply devout and religious man with a plan to further Islam in Turkey and hoped that like-minded governments across the region would embrace the oppressed Islamists who sought to overthrow despotic regimes in a pro-democratic wave. His links to the Muslim Brotherhood movement go back a long way but have grown stronger in the wake of the Arab Spring in the late 2010. Erdogan wants to position himself as the leader of a new Middle East. This is a direct challenge to Saudi Arabia, the leader of the old Middle East and an avowed enemy of the Brotherhood. Turkey’s impassioned backing of Mohamed Morsi, and other Brotherhood inspired movements created a kind of regional anti- Erdogan bloc led by the Saudis, General El Sisi of Egypt and the UAE’s Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. Gulf monarchies and dictatorships have long seen Muslim movements as existential threats and potentially disruptive to the established order. Further, in 2017, when bin Salman unveiled a bold agenda of “returning the kingdom of Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam”, the most surprising attack came from Erdogan. At an international conference he attacked the crown prince with “He does not own Islam”. In doing so Erdogan was also rejecting the unoffi cial but long-standing Saudi claim as the guardian of Islam. Lastly, Turkey’s impending economic crisis and the role of that cannot be negated. Ankara has an enormous amount of dollar denomination debt. They need hard currency, foreign exchange, investment opportunities and other economic reliefs. All of which Saudi Arabia and much of the Gulf countries can provide since currently Ankara is dependent on countries with liquidity. Erdogan is adamant on not going to the IMF or European allies to seek assistance and aid. It is for this reason also that Turkey will continue to milk the Khashoggi investigation for all its worth. Changing Regional Dynamics Ankara and Riyadh are on diff erent political trajectories with the divisions not being limited to just Islam, but also to the changing geopolitical strongholds. For decades, Turkey stayed out of the region’s politics. As secular state, a member of the NATO and a candidate for the European Union membership, it was seeking deeper integration into the West. With Erdogan’s version of political Islam, the change in focus towards the Middle East was an inevitability. This has led to uncomfortable alliances and partnerships. In June 2017, the Saudi led trade and diplomatic blockade of Qatar resulted in the country seeking help from Turkey. Ankara readily deployed troops in a show of force to help ensure that the Saudis would not invade. Erdogan has also found a way of simultaneously competing and coordinating with Shia Iran in its alliance with Russia against the Saudis in Syria and Yemen, resulting in being accused by bin Salman as being part of the “triangle of evil”. Saudi’s arch rival though seems to gain plenty from this chaos. In a March interview with TIME, the crown prince had declared, “Any problem in the Middle East, you will fi nd Iran.” Well, not this one. Tehran has received political ammunition and a moral high ground at a time when foreign leaders widely criticize the regime for being the main source of instability in the region. Riyadh has gone to great lengths to isolate Tehran, from holding the Lebanese Prime Minister hostage, to building ties with Israel and punishing Qatar for its proximity to the Islamic Republic. For now, the Iranians are quietly savoring the sight of their foe cast in the role of a barbarian and making it even harder to portray Iran as the ultimate villain Although, it is unlikely that there will occur a reframe in the political order across the region and undermine Saudi Arabia’s authority. A number of regional allies have sent messages of support for the Kingdom. Offi cials from Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, the Palestinian National Authority, the UAE and Yemen have expressed their backing for Riyadh and were quick to defend it with an apparently coordinated series of responses, further affi rming Saudi’s role as the leading Muslim power in the Arab World. Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 6 • Issue 10 • Oct-Nov 2018, Noida • 9