IN FOCUS
gain for the Indian Air Force, as well as a bold step in terms
of India’s overall foreign policy. It is clear that ‘Triumf’
systems were necessary for Indian defence and signing the
contract was not an issue of public debate. At the same time,
it turned out to be the only important agreement between
India and Russia.
Surprisingly, the widely discussed deals on Kamov
helicopters and Krivak/ Talwar class frigates were not
concluded. As the Russian Ambassador to India Nikolay
Kudashev explained in an interview, talks are still underway
and “new sizeable deals involving Make in India programme”
are expected by the end of this year or at the very beginning
of the next one. iii These contracts are to be discussed at the
Inter-Governmental Commission on Military-Technical
Cooperation scheduled to take place in December 2018. There
is a growing perception in Russia that India has been slowly
drifting away and, as a consequence, imports of Russian arms
is likely to shrink in size. iv For this reason, the fi nalisation
of contracts, or the lack of it, on helicopters, frigates and
license for the production of Kalashnikov rifl es will be an
important indicator of the trajectory of Indo-Russian defence
cooperation.
Before President Putin’s visit to India, his aide Yuri
Ushakov had announced that there were some 23 documents
on the agenda, with some of them “still in the phase of
coordination”. v Agreements between India and Russia during
the summit were low in number and substance as a majority
of them were pro forma documents. Yet, the two sides
managed to diff er in the overall number of signed documents.
According to the Indian Ministry of External Aff airs, the two
countries exchanged eight agreements, whereas the Kremlin
indicated nine. The Programme for Cooperation Between the
Governments of Moscow and Delhi was not mentioned by the
Indian side but included as a deliverable by Moscow. vi The
fact that an offi cial agreement was forgotten and, as a result,
omitted in the list of documents raises questions about the
signifi cance of such ‘protocols’ and ‘memorandums’.
Iran Factor
Referring to third countries by name is not a customary
practice in bilateral joint statements. Aside from Bangladesh –
the fi rst destination for Russia-India joint energy cooperation
in a third country – these days Iran is an important and at the
same time tricky partner for both India and Russia. Iran was
mentioned several times in the joint statement: Firstly, in the
context of the upcoming trilateral meeting on the side-lines of
“Transport Week-2018” in Moscow and, secondly, in support
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the
Iranian nuclear programme. vii
Amidst the American sanctions on Iran becoming a new
reality, several projects that both New Delhi and Moscow are
interested in are under threat of being shelved. Developing
Chabahar Port is of high signifi cance to India as it is regarded
as a crucial transit point in the International North-South
Transport Corridor (INSTC) and some other connectivity
projects aimed at increasing Indian trade with Central Asia. A
transport network connecting India and Russia could facilitate
India-Iran bilateral trade as well. Hence, implementation of
the 16-year old agreement on INSTC is of vital importance
for both Moscow and New Delhi. During the summit, Russia
and India called for the development of this initiative “…
by fi nalizing pending issues …through bilateral discussions
as well as discussions with other partner countries at the
earliest”. They also agreed to “make eff orts to convene the
INSTC Ministerial and Coordination meeting on priority”. viii
The INSTC is not the only project which will probably
suff er from US sanctions on Iran. The Iran-Pakistan-India
(IPI) off shore gas pipeline is another example of a long-
standing project that may well remain on a waiting list due
to America’s restrictive measures against Tehran. Beyond
the issue of sanctions, negotiations among the participating
countries on this project also remain at a nascent stage.
The Russian and Pakistani energy ministries have signed
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the pipeline
project, whereas Russia-India talks on this matter are
still underway. Moscow and New Delhi have pledged to
continue consultations and move forward towards a “possible
conclusion of Memorandum of Understanding”.
With Russia eagerly looking to expand cooperation with
Iran, much will depend on the Indian approach towards the
US demand to halt energy ties with Tehran. As of now, it
seems that India will not reduce the import of Iranian oil and
petrochemicals to nil. Although private Indian companies are
forced to cease connections with Iran, state-owned fi rms have
reportedly placed orders for crude oil delivery in November. ix
The Indo-Pacifi c
Dialogue on regional dynamics and maritime cooperation
has turned into an integral part of India’s engagement
with the US, Japan, Australia, France and other regional
players. However, Moscow and New Delhi are yet to begin
consultations on regional issues. In his press statement,
Prime Minister Modi underlined that “both countries have
common interest in cooperating on terrorism, developments
in Afghanistan and Indo-Pacifi c ….” x Notably, in the Russian
version of the Indian Prime Minister’s statement, the word
“Indo-Pacifi c” was not included. Although translation issues
often occur in offi cial documents, this is not evidently a case
involving such a diffi culty. No wonder that the India-Russia
joint statement refers to the Indo-Pacifi c as “the regions of
Pacifi c and Indian Oceans”, thus dividing one integrated
region into two sub-regions.
This is not the fi rst time that the two sides have referred
to the region in diff erent terms. After the ‘informal talks’
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 6 • Issue 10 • Oct-Nov 2018, Noida • 41