Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
Y ears ago , while I was toiling at the United Na * ons , the interna * onal community — gathered together at the level of heads of state and government at a Millennium Summit in New York — endorsed the idea that they had a collec * ve responsibility to protect civilians whose own governments were unable or unwilling to do so . Sovereignty was all very well , the world leaders agreed , but it came with certain du * es to the people in whose name it was exercised , and if sovereign governments couldn ’ t prevent massive human rights abuses ( or worse , inflicted them on their own people ), then the world had the duty to do something about it . The new doctrine was immediately dubbed ‘ R2P ’, short for ‘ responsibility to protect ’.
This was a twist to the earlier arguments for ‘ the right to humanitarian interven * on ’, turning the issue on its head : the principle was no longer about the right of foreigners to intervene in third countries for humanitarian purposes , but rather their responsibility to protect people , if necessarily through interven * on . The evoca * ve image behind R2P was that of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda , when perhaps a million people died in a mass slaughter conducted by machete-wielding Tutsi mili * a — a horror that could have been prevented had the interna * onal community taken on such a responsibility , and intervened with a few thousand troops , instead of withdrawing the UN Blue Helmets who already happened to be there .
It all sounded very noble and altruis * c . The UK ’ s telegenic and hyper-ar * culate then prime minister , Tony Blair , memorably declared that in the future , the West would go to war in the name of its values , not just of its interests . The wars of the future , Blair and his acolytes argued , would be fought for peace and human rights , not over something as crass as na * onal interests , oil
Indeed , the first major military interven @ on aier the Millennium Summit — the Iraq war in 2003 — was ini @ ally sought to be couched in the language of humanitarianism by its proponents .
( perish the thought !) or imperial lust for territorial aggrandizement . The only catch in all this was in applying the principle to an actual case . As Rwanda had revealed , governments were all-too-unwilling to risk blood and treasure for the sake of foreign lives . Would armies actually intervene out of disinterested humanitarianism , or only do so when such declared intent in fact masked more cynical mo * ves ?
Indeed , the first major military interven * on ajer the Millennium Summit — the Iraq war in 2003 — was ini * ally sought to be couched in the language of humanitarianism by its proponents . But this was hotly rejected by the votaries of R2P , who argued that the war was squarely anchored in Washington ’ s geopoli * cal interests rather than in any real concern for suffering Iraqi civilians . Blairite altruism never quite recovered its credibility in the ajermath of Iraq .
R2P has suddenly come to life again , though , with the aerial military interven * on by NATO forces in Libya . Since the UN Security Council resolu * on that authorized the ac * on permiQed countries to use ‘ all necessary means ’ to stop the assaults by Gaddafi ’ s forces on Libyans rising up against his oppressive regime , the bombardments were described as humanitarian in intent , aimed at saving Libyan lives . The idea was supposed to be to level the playing field so that a peaceful seQlement could be nego * ated by the contending par * es , as had happened in Egypt and Tunisia . This was meant to be a war for peace .
It hasn ’ t worked out that way . The Western air forces did not simply stop their ac * on once they had neutralized Gaddafi ’ s aQacks on rebel-held Benghazi . They went on pounding ground targets , causing considerable civilian casual * es . An aQack on Gaddafi ’ s compound , which killed one of his children , suggests that the objec * ve has moved well beyond the imposi * on of a ‘ no-flight zone ’ to protect civilians on the ground to geqng rid of Gaddafi himself — in effect , regime change . Exactly as it eventually transpired .
My American writer friend David Rieff , who was once an enthusias * c interven * onist in the civil war in Yugoslavia but has since recanted ( see his book , At the Point of a Gun ) now cri * cizes ‘ the messianic dream of
Image 37 : President George W . Bush , surrounded by leaders of the House and Senate , announces the Joint ResoluLon to authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq , October 2 , 2002 .
My American writer friend David Rieff , who was once an enthusias * c interven * onist in the civil war in Yugoslavia but has since recanted ( see his book , At the Point of a Gun ) now cri * cizes ‘ the messianic dream of remaking the world in either the image of American democracy or of the legal utopias of interna * onal human rights law ’. This is not just because it isn ’ t easy to do , nor that it involves taking more lives than it saves . It ’ s also , simply , because Rieff , and gradually other Americans , are coming around to the view that interven * on isn ’ t right in any circumstances . He even told the New York Times ’ Maureen Dowd that ‘ Qaddafi is a terrible man , but I don ’ t think it ’ s the business of the United States to overthrow him . Those who want America to support democra * c movements and
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