Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
While the de Mistura mission con * nues , it is also necessary to look for the reasons for the failure of the Annan and Brahimi missions . Annan and Brahimi failed for no fault of their own , but we can draw valuable lessons from their media * on . In 2012 , the UN developed a guide for effec * ve media * on based on an in-depth study of such efforts by the UN and others . The observa * ons can be listed under a few categories :
1 . Mission and Mandate : The mandate can be wide or narrow . Both Annan and Brahimi were given a rather narrow mandate . For example , Brahimi wanted to invite Iran , a key player , but owing to objec * on from the US and the others , Iran was not invited to Geneva II . Annan did not have the choice to explore the op * on of a power-sharing a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h A s s a d remaining in office .
2 . Impar @ ality and Inclusivity : If the mediator is to work for transfer of power from the incumbent to a newly created body , it follows
If the mediator is to work for transfer of power from the incumbent to a newly created body , it follows that the incumbent will not see the mediator as impar @ al .
that the incumbent will not see the mediator as impar * al . While it is desirable to be as inclusive as possible in choosing the interlocutors , the mediator should also consider the risk that intransigent interlocutors with limited influence can spoil the process .
3 . Entry and Consent : If the par * es to the conflict who find themselves in a state of a ‘ hur * ng stalemate ’ approach the mediator , his task will be easier . If only one of the par * es is interested in media * on and that too only when that party is losing ground , there is no chance of success for the media * on . The people who are vic * ms of the conflict might suffer enormously , but the par * es to the conflict might not care as in the case of Syria .
4 . Strategy : What comes first , ceasefire or a poli * cal arrangement ? If the ceasefire comes first and if there is no rapid progress towards a poli * cal seQlement , the ceasefire might not last . If there is a poli * cal seQlement , the ceasefire can be a component of it . It is difficult to nego * ate a seQlement when the two sides are killing each other . Obviously , there cannot be a standard opera * ng procedure in this regard .
Brahimi engaged intensively with the intra-Syrian par * es , more so with the mul * tudinous opposi * on groups . He asked Assad to be a " kingmaker " rather than king and he did not like it . The Syrian government delega * on came to aQend the Geneva II Conference only to please Russia on which it was cri * cally dependent . The delega * on wanted to discuss only ‘ terrorism ’, as in Assad ’ s eyes all his adversaries are terrorists . The opposi * on wanted to discuss only transi * onal government and wanted the process to begin with Assad ’ s exit , a demand that was uQerly unrealis * c .
Assad has not lost , but he has not won either . He has survived at a
Image 33 : Joint Special Envoy of the United NaLons and the League of Arab States on the Syrian Crisis , Kofi Annan ( R ), with the Spokesperson for UN-Arab League
Assad has not lost , but he has not won either . He has survived at a terrible cost . Peace , stability , and speedy reconstruc * on — poli * cally and otherwise — in Syria are much needed . Those who love peace , and hate war and know its fu * lity , should never give up .
Lessons and Prospects
Annan began his mission in an unfavourable climate . As men * oned earlier , the opposi * on and its external supporters had arrived at a wrong conclusion that Assad was about to fall . The very designa * on as joint representa * ve of the UN and the LAS detracted from his acceptability in Damascus ' eyes . Annan deliberately resorted to ‘ crea * ve ambiguity ’ in the choice of words about the transi * onal government . But that stratagem did not work .
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