Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
A
ccording to the UN, "preven*ve diplomacy refers to diploma*c ac*on
taken to prevent disputes from escala*ng into conflicts and to limit
the spread of conflicts when they occur. While it is conducted in
different forms and fora, both public and private, the most common
expression of preven*ve diplomacy is found in the work of envoys
dispatched to crisis areas to encourage dialogue, compromise and the
peaceful resolu*on of tensions." The defini*on is good, but it is necessary to
add that the mediator should be neutral. It is painfully obvious that
preven*ve diplomacy whether prac*ced by UN or others has signally failed
in the case of Syria. One can begin with briefly summing up the efforts
undertaken and iden*fy the reasons for the lack of success so far.
and the external powers suppor*ng them were serious about a
nego*ated resolu*on of the crisis. Annan worked out a six-point plan that
Syria agreed to albeit not without reserva*ons. Damascus had wanted to
include in the plan the cessa*on of assistance to the opposi*on by
external powers, but Annan did not agree. In March 2012, UNSC and
Syria endorsed the plan. A ceasefire came into effect and in April 2012
the UNSC approved the crea*on of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria
(UNSMIS) comprised of unarmed military personnel. In May 2012, over
100 people were killed near the town of Houla. The UNSMIS held pro-
Assad forces responsible for it and in June 2012, suspended its
opera*ons. Undeterred, Annan convened an Ac*on Group mee*ng in
Beginnings and Geneva I
The 22-member League of Arab States (LAS) was the first to apply
preven*ve diplomacy. The LAS does not have a good track record of
successful media*on and it was an ill-starred mission right from the start.
Even before LAS entered as a mediator, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain
had recalled their ambassadors from Damascus. The LAS made two
aQempts. The Syrian government agreed to a package of measures proposed
by LAS that included release of poli*cal prisoners and an end to violent
ac*on against protesters. The LAS discon*nued its mission as it found that
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was not delivering on his part of the
bargain. It suspended Syria’s membership and imposed sanc*ons. A second
aQempt was made, and a military monitoring mission was sta*oned in Syria
in December 2011. That was
withdrawn in January 2012. By then,
The 22-member League of Saudi Arabia and Qatar had begun
Arab States (LAS) was the providing aid to the an*-Assad forces.
first to apply preven@ve
diplomacy. The LAS does
not have a good track
record of successful
media@on and it was an
ill-starred mission right
from the start.
Image 31:UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura
The LAS mission was ill-starred also
because a past animosity exists
between Damascus and Riyadh.
Furthermore, Riyadh and Doha had
come to the wrong conclusion that
Assad was on his way out and that all
that was needed was a liQle push. The
LAS and the West moved a UN
Security Council (UNSC) resolu*on
threatening sanc*ons and calling upon Assad to step down. Russia and
China vetoed the resolu*on as they feared a repeat of the Libyan precedent
in which the West had used an UNSC resolu*on to begin NATO bombing in
Libya.
Geneva, Switzerland, on 30 June, which later came to be known as the
Geneva I Conference.
The Ac*on Group iden*fied steps for the par*es to the conflict to take
for ending it. The Final Communiqué of the Geneva I conference
iden*fied the establishment of a transi*onal governing body exercising
“full execu*ve powers,” which “could include members of the present
government and the opposi*on and other groups and shall be formed on
the basis of mutual consent.” The formula*on did not spell out whether or
not Assad should exit. Annan had hoped that Russia and China on the one
hand,