Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
up at the UN Security Council. In this regard, Sri Lanka failed diploma*cally
in demonstra*ng to the interna*onal community the military and human
sacrifices of the three-decade long conflict.
Neelan Thiruchelvan and Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Thus,
when speaking about conflict diplomacy, it is important to look at how
one goes about achieving it; especially in instances where self-
determina*on has militant underpinnings, as was the LTTE case.
In the end, the shunning of external actors from the civil war is what gained
Rajapaksa his poli*cal clout in claiming victory - in terms of diplomacy, it
showed the many invisible hands involved in the Sri Lankan conflict.
Historically, the Indian sphere of influence with its geopoli*cal
underpinnings manifested itself through the vocal Tamilian community of the
Indian state of Tamil Nadu. This ethnic base not only influenced the conflict
in Sri Lanka but also had, and s*ll has, strong influences on the government
of India. It resulted in Tamil Nadu providing military assistance for the
separate state of Eelam as well as establishing and opera*ng training camps
for the LTTE rebel group within its territory. This represented a total failure
of diploma*c channels bilaterally between India and Sri Lanka in terms of
conflict diplomacy.
A third external contributor to the framing of the war narra*ve was the
strong influence of the Tamilian diaspora community residing in ethnic
pockets of the US, Canada, Australia and Europe. Tamilians wielded
poli*cal influence in these countries as they made up strong voter bases.
This led to the West pandering to their claims of human rights viola*ons
in Sri Lanka. Colombo failed to
meaningfully connect with this Another external factor was
diaspora community and their
the rounds of peace-talks
aliena*on ul*mately led to
external interven*on in the and peace processes that
internal affairs of Sri Lanka, and did not operate within the
the tarnishing of its interna*onal conflict diplomacy
standing. The same diploma*c mechanism. The peace
disconnect seems to persist in
nego@a@ons were plagued
the Sirisena regime, although
there has been some aQempt to by mistrust and par@es
engage with the diaspora in seeking poli@cal gain, thus
terms of reconcilia*on.
rendering them ineffec@ve.
It is important also to note that
the Sri Lankan conflict must be understood in the correct context as there
are mul*faceted dimensions and many narra*ves that form the basis of
the conflict as described thus far. A fight against a ruthless terrorist outfit
with a poli*cal agenda, ethnic grievances, communal issues, civil strife,
humanitarian opera*ons by interna*onal actors and counter-insurgency
opera*ons were all threads interwoven into the war. Thus, conflict
diplomacy in the Sri Lankan context must be approached with an
appropriate understanding of the contribu*ng factors as well as the
historical narra*ve. In this overarching framework, geopoli*cal influence
also has a role to play, as now more than ever, Sri Lanka is drawing
regional and extra-regional strategic interest.
Image 29: A LTTE Sea Tiger fast aBack fiberglass boat passing a Sri Lankan freighter
sunken by the Sea Tigers north of the village of MullaiLvu, North-eastern Sri Lanka
Another external factor was the rounds of peace-talks and peace processes
that did not operate within the conflict diplomacy mechanism. The peace
nego*a*ons were plagued by mistrust and par*es seeking poli*cal gain, thus
rendering them ineffec*ve. In certain instances, the peace nego*a*ons were
seen as an opportunity for internal power play. Such was the case in 2004,
which saw the defeat of the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe, by
the crea*on of a grand coali*on by then President Chandrika
Bandaranayake, to take control of the government via the collapse of the
Norwegian peace deal. Kumaratunga, in 2004, dissolved parliament and
called for renewed parliamentary elec*ons, which later saw Wickramasinghe
lose power and the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE being revoked. Yet,
this is not to say that the LTTE would have accepted a poli*cal solu*on to
the conflict. The Eelam aspira*on was for a separate state and the means to
achieve it were through guerrilla warfare. This is why the LTTE stockpiled
weapons during the *me of the ceasefire and assassinated many of their
The island, in this post-conflict era, has to work on three dis*nc*ve areas
of conflict diplomacy. First, preven*ve diplomacy must be applied in the
country and a re-engagement strategy in the form of a substan*ve policy
document that not only illustrates the government’s stance but also
provides a plakorm for the disillusioned Sri Lankan diaspora should be
devised. The Sri Lankan missions overseas could play a key role in
execu*ng such a policy; this exercise would be ideologically produc*ve in
denouncing the Tamilian Eelam trajectory. Second, by involving
interna*onal stakeholde