Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
At one point , I was in Washington and called with the then Irish ambassador to the US . He took me with him to an evening recep * on at the home of an influen * al Irish- American lawyer who had been asked by the Irish government to look at the PaQen process and advise Dublin in due course . He came to Northern Ireland and I took him to meet people , including the prisoners ’ leaders in the Maze Prison . My
With support from friendly governments , the Paaen Commission reached out across the world in the search for good and relevant policing prac @ ce , from New York to Oaawa to Cape Town and across Europe .
purpose was for him to inhale the conflict and have it inform his senses . I took him out on the ground before he returned to the diploma * c dinner tables . In turn , Mr PaQen and his fellow commissioners engaged with me and my colleagues . They were about the business of structural change ; ours was the long , slow grind of changing police culture . Changing structures without changing culture is ul * mately ineffectual . And the reform of policing in Northern Ireland is a good example of how fruikul diplomacy can be . Diploma * c ac * vity on police reform helped develop consensus between governments and helped prepare the ground between poli * cal leaders in Northern Ireland . And , in terms of the work I was doing as leader of a local NGO , the PaQen Commission increased our credibility and relevance .
In another useful twist during those years , the then Bill Clinton-led administra * on in the US introduced a programme to fund groups from Northern Ireland undertaking field trips to the US . Thus , over a four-year period , the US Department of State enabled us to bring senior and middle rank police officers and a number of civil society leaders to New York , Washington , New Jersey , Boston , Atlanta and San Diego . I should add that we did not ask the Americans to teach us how to police Northern Ireland – that was a task best lej to our own police and people . However , what the US field trips did do for us was to provide useful parallels from the challenges facing ‘ Community-Oriented Policing ’ in the US and , as importantly , to enable key people to spend * me together away from the heat of our conflict . And it should be noted that this study programme was another product of diplomacy : somebody had lobbied in Capitol Hill for such funds to be created in the first place and , as it happened , I was brought ‘ up the hill ’ to brief Irish American poli * cians about how US tax dollars were being spent on suppor * ng police reform as part of the opera * onal outworking of the Northern Ireland peace process .
Over the years of the Northern Ireland conflict , before , during and ajer the peace process , various US senators and members of Congress lobbied and agitated in support of peace efforts in Ireland . It should be noted that , apart from their personal interest and commitment to Ireland , the energy driving US interest came from the massive Irish-American diaspora . An es * mated 44 million Americans claim to have some Irish blood in their veins . Thus , harnessing the poten * al power of the relevant diaspora is a lesson worth
learning for those concerned with conflict diplomacy in other troubled parts of the world .
Image 26 : The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland was established in 1998 as part of the Belfast Agreement , intended as a major step in the Northern Ireland peace process . Chaired by ConservaLve poliLcian Chris PaBen , it was beBer known as the PaBen Commission . ( The Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland )
In terms of ‘ conflict diplomacy ’ I would observe three significant types in support of the Irish peace process : ‘ Track One ’ ( official , governmental and inter-governmental ), principally by the Bri * sh and Irish governments working in close partnership and , at key moments , suppor * ve ac * vity by successive US governments and , laQerly , by the European Union ; ‘ Track Two ’ ( non-governmental ) ini * a * ves and ac * vi * es by civil society leaders , NGOs and academics within and without Northern Ireland . Seminars , trainings and conferences abroad provided cover for poli * cal players to meet , away from the glare of the media . At one point , a Boston-based Irish academic organised a trip to South Africa for poli * cal leaders and party strategists . The trip included a well-publicised mee * ng with Nelson Mandela and , to this day , photographs with the great statesman hang on office walls in Belfast and appear in poli * cal memoirs . The South Africa trip infused a * mely dose of morality and vision into the par * es , in advance of the final nego * a * ons for the Good Friday Agreement .
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