Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
Federal Council ( UNFC ) comprising two groups that have not signed the NCA ; and the Federal Poli * cal Nego * a * ons and Consulta * ve CommiQee ( FPNCC ) comprising the remaining groups who have not signed the document , led by the UWSA . Myanmar ’ s ethnic stakeholders have historically been highly diverse and any further division could only complicate challenges of developing coherent posi * ons on key issues .
Despite Democracy
During her elec * on campaign to the 2015 parliamentary and provincial elec * ons , Suu Kyi had promised to make the peace process and na * onal reconcilia * on her priority . For Suu Kyi
Myanmar ’ s ethnic stakeholders have historically been highly diverse and any further division could only complicate challenges of developing coherent posi @ ons on key issues . and the EAOs , federalism remains a key element in resolving Myanmar ’ s decades of violence and ethnic conflict . However , apart from the fact that all poli * cians are hostages to their poli * cal ambi * ons , federalism has con * nued to denote different things to different actors .
Amid con * nuing contesta * on with the Tatmadaw , Suu Kyi ’ s policies have demonstrated a clear unwillingness to break away from the military-led and chartered path . Although she cons * tuted a new government peace monitoring body , the Union Peace Dialogue Joint CommiQee ( UPDJC ), which replaced the previous Myanmar Peace Center and introduced a seven-point policy of na * onal reconcilia * on , these have been liQle more than tokenism . Two peace conferences – labelled the 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference – have been held under her regime . The third one was due to take place at the end of January 2018 but has been postponed . However , there are ques * ons about how effec * ve these mee * ngs have been . In spite of the tremendous poli * cal capital Suu Kyi has , both the civilian as well as the military leadership ’ s inability to be magnanimous and accommoda * ve of some of the genuine concerns of the ethnic insurgencies have led to the process mee * ng a deadlock , at least since May 2017 , when the second UPC was held .
External Actors
In addi * on to the EAOs , the Tatmadaw , and Myanmar ’ s civilian government headed by Suu Kyi , external actors cons * tute the fourth and final set of stakeholders in the peace process . As men * oned before , while the Western countries linked the gradual withdrawal of sanc * ons to the progress of democracy in Myanmar , their commitment to the peace process with the EAOs was less than serious . Even as the war in the Kachin and other regions con * nued amid large-scale reports of human rights viola * ons , the Tatmadaw limited the access of the interna * onal NGOs and journalists to the region . In response , the UN feebly appealed to authori * es in Myanmar to be open and
transparent . The US merely underlined the need to bring peace to the violence-stricken regions . Even the Associa * on of Southeast Asian Na * ons ( ASEAN ), of which Myanmar was the chair between 2014 and 2015 , chose to remain aloof by subscribing to its principle of noninterference in member countries ’ domes * c affairs .
In contrast , China , Myanmar ’ s northern neighbour , con * nues to play a complex role in the peace process , maintaining * es and influence over both the state and non-state actors in Myanmar . The EAOs in the Kachin and Shan States have had strong tradi * onal * es with China , making the laQer a direct stakeholder in the conflicts ’ resolu * on . With some of the special interest groups within China funding the
Image 20 : Children at the Ban Tractor refugee camp on the Thai / Myanmar border . Decades of conflict in Myanmar has led to forced displacement
China , Myanmar ’ s northern neighbour , con @ nues to play a complex role in the peace process , maintaining @ es and influence over both the state and non-state actors in Myanmar .
Beijing ’ s role has been further complicated . For example , local authori * es in Yunnan have previously developed extensive business * es in mining , logging , and crop subs * tu * on in Shan and Kachin States . These have taken place without the approval of the Myanmar or Chinese central authori * es . China has reportedly allowed the Myanmar Na * onal D e m o c r a * c A l l i a n c e A r m y ( MNDAA ), which s * ll fights the Tatmadaw to use its territory to evade the laQer ’ s onslaught . The MNDAA has even been allowed to open a bank account in Beijing to collect dona * ons from the sympathe * c Chinese public . China ’ s influence over the insurgencies remains unrivalled .
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