Diplomatist Magazine Annual Edition 2018 | Page 40

Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
of Gaza once Israel withdrew , to prepare it for autonomy . Such clauses were dropped . Finally , the first Oslo Accord ( Oslo I ) was signed in Washington DC in September 1993 .
Before the official Israeli nego * ators arrived , Norway played the role of a facilitator and ensured that it was an informal , non-threatening ambience , making it possible for the two sides to engage with each other . Retractability and avoidance of dwelling on the past helped , not to speak of the secrecy . On 18 August 1993 , Norway ' s then Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst spoke for eight hours on the phone with Arafat in Tunis to sort out some points . Arafat ’ s lack of fluency in English must have been a disadvantage to him to him while nego * a * ng the text of the draj . Israel made it clear that Jerusalem ' s status was not nego * able . By using the words “ permanent seQlement ” to be nego * ated later , Israel avoided commiqng itself to agreeing to an independent Pales * nian state . In Oslo , the PLO recognised the state of Israel and in return Israel recognised the PLO as the representa * ve of the Pales * nian people . A more unequal bargain cannot be imagined . Furthermore , while the PLO renounced ‘ terrorism ’, there was no reciprocal commitment by Israel though the PLO did ask for it .
The 1994 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Israel ' s then Prime Minister
Image 17 : PalesLnian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas , President George W . Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon aqer reading statement to the press during the closing moments of the Red Sea Summit in Aqaba , Jordan Jun 4 , 2003 .
The 1994 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Israel ' s then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin , Israel ' s then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres , and PLO ' s then Chairman Yasser Arafat . As a follow-up to Oslo I , another agreement known as Oslo II was signed in Taba , Egypt , in September 1995 . In November 1995 , an extremist Israeli Jew assassinated Rabin for signing the Oslo Accords , and Benjamin Netanyahu won the 1996 elec * on . That marked the burial of the Oslo Accords . Meanwhile , there is evidence that Israel tried to kill Arafat more than once .
' Postscript to Oslo ’
In 2001 , Norway sought a post-mortem of the talks as the peace process was stalled , and appointed Professor Hilde Henriksen Waage to find out what really happened . She was granted full access to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( MFA ) files . To her uQer surprise and shock , she found " not a single scrap of paper for the en * re period from January to September 1993 — precisely the period of the backchannel talks " was available with the Norwegian MFA . All the papers were kept in the personal custody of the foreign minister and his deputy . Ajer an exhaus * ve study , Waage concluded that Norway played the role of a " helpful errand boy " for Israel , whose ‘ red lines ’ had been invariably respected . Norway tried to persuade the PLO of the merit of Israel ’ s case , but never the other way round .
The 2000s
Here , two other media * on aQempts deserve a men * on . In July 2000 , the then US President Bill Clinton presided over at Camp David nego * a * ons between Israel ' s then Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO ' s Chairman Arafat . The talks broke down because Israel refused to fully withdraw from the territories it captured in 1967 . On Jerusalem ,
By using the words “ permanent sealement ” to be nego @ ated later , Israel avoided commilng itself to agreeing to an independent Pales @ nian state .
Barak was not prepared to give more than symbolic sovereignty over a part of East Jerusalem . Arafat insisted on the Right of Return of the Pales * nians who lej in 1948 , but Israel placed a limit of 100,000 for family reunion . Even regarding West Bank , the Pales * nians were geqng pieces of discon * nuous territories , a " moth-eaten " West Bank , to use Pakistan ' s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah ’ s phrase , with more jus * fica * on than he ever had . In September 2000 , soon ajer the talks broke down , Ariel Sharon of the Likud party , keen to sabotage any serious nego * a * ons with the Pales * nians , provoked them by visi * ng the al-Haram al-Sharif ( Temple Mount for the Israelis ) flanked by a thousand security men . Sharon got what he wanted and a new In * fada , known as the Al-Aqsa In * fada , began . However , Sharon failed to prevent the resump * on of talks .
During the January 2001 talks held at Taba in Sinai , Egypt , the two delega * ons made commendable progress . However , Israel was due for an elec * on and Barak had to suspend the talks . The joint statement said , “ The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resump * on of nego * a * ons following the Israeli elec * ons .” Sharon won the elec * on and he was not going to talk to the
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