Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
Image 14: US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Gerald Ford at a meeLng with Indonesia's President Suharto and Foreign Minister Adam Malik on 6 December
aspect of this interven*on was that ASEAN states par*cipated in the mission
in a groundbreaking development, but were careful to balance the military
commitment with a recogni*on that any such involvement had to be
nego*ated with the Indonesian government. This once again reflected
ASEAN's unique way of managing security, indica*ng a flexible, informal and
non-violent consensual approach to diplomacy, which has now come to be
seen as a viable preven*ve diplomacy approach. ASEAN itself has learnt
lessons from the East Timor issue, where it was cri*cised as being too slow
to act due to its adherence to the principle of non-interference. Following
East Timor, ASEAN has become more sensi*ve to internal developments of
member states that could have an impact on the region as a whole. This has
brought about a proac*ve stance in ASEAN's approach to internal
developments in member states that could affect regional security. ASEAN
also views the func*on of preven*ve diplomacy as one that can prevent a
dispute from turning violent. ASEAN therefore considers conflict preven*on
and preven*ve diplomacy as interlinked. The lesson from ASEAN's approach
is that preven*ve diplomacy should be given more *me to play out, and the
post-crisis phase should allow
for reconcilia*on of the
par*es involved in the
dispute. This is in sharp
contrast to the European and
U S a p p ro a c h o f fo r m a l
seQlement, which may have
to be imposed on the par*es,
some*mes containing within
the seQlement the seeds of
another erup*on.
The lesson from ASEAN's
approach is that preven@ve
diplomacy should be given
more @me to play out, and the
post crisis phase should allow
for reconcilia@on of the par@es
involved in the dispute.
As far as conflict preven*on is concerned, the dispute in the case of East
Timor was between a colonial power which wanted to cling on to its hold
over the territory and Indonesia which had forcibly annexed the state.
Once the independence movement began to grow, Indonesia, which had
previously assured the Portuguese of not interfering, reneged on this
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