Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
P reven * ve Diplomacy was introduced as a concept to the world in 1992 in a report * tled An Agenda for Peace , authored by the then UN Secretary General , Boutros Boutros-Ghali . AQen * on was turned on to the security func * on of the UN - which had long been disabled due to the Cold War - which had to be revived . In that context , preven * ve diplomacy , peacemaking and peacekeeping became important . In 2007 , the then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sought to improve the UN ' s preven * ve diplomacy machinery .
Ajer lessons learnt from across the world over several years of experience , it is now generally accepted that preven * ve diplomacy is successful if it manages to stop a conflict from turning violent , or if already violent , manages to stop this violence . Preven * ve diplomacy should also help in deescala * on and neutralisa * on of conflict . If one applies this principle to the
History has shown that whenever major powers take interest in a conflict , the chances of success of preven @ ve diplomacy efforts are reduced . case of East Timor , one can draw many interes * ng lessons due to the peculiar situa * on of the Asia Pacific region . Mainly , the scope of preven * ve diplomacy as seen from the prism of many countries , and certainly the Asia Pacific , was that this concept was about diplomacy , and should not be confused with preven * ve military deployments or interference in any country ' s internal affairs . In other words , the reliance of preven * ve diplomacy is seen to be on non-coercive diploma * c methods . ' Consent ' of directly involved par * es is therefore seen as essen * al .
East Timor had been added as the 27th province of Indonesia in 1975 , prior to gaining independence from Portugal . In January 1999 , Indonesia surprisingly announced a popular vote on the future of the territory . A UN organised referendum in August 1999 resulted in an overwhelming proindependence vote . Violence by an * -independence mili * as followed in Dili , the capital of East Timor , and the rest of the territory . The UN Security Council ( UNSC ) -authorised Interna * onal Force East Timor ( INTERFET ) was led by Australia which made Indonesia invite Southeast Asian countries too to take part in the mission . The mission was supported by the US , and was able to swijly restore order , de-escala * ng the conflict . The reasons for the success of this preven * ve diplomacy exercise were clear : limited interference by major powers , UN legi * macy , and the establishment of the INTERFET in a clear and transparent manner .
History has shown that whenever major powers take interest in a conflict , the chances of success of preven * ve diplomacy efforts are reduced . It is ojen the case that a veto power in the UNSC and the broader interests of the great powers can complicate the conflict , even though great power interest could prove beneficial in stopping violence and conflict in many cases . In the case of East Timor , the Associa * on of Southeast Asian Na * ons ( ASEAN ) could have played a role , but was not seen as a neutral party given the Indonesia ' s involvement as a party to the conflict . The UN or INTERFET
force was viewed as a legi * mate actor as compared to ASEAN because it was perceived as being more neutral . INTERFET was aided by the fact that the objec * ves were clear from the b e g i n n i n g . “ A l l n e c e s s a r y measures ” were to be taken to “ restore peace and security in East Timor , protect and support the mission in East Timor , and f a c i l i t a t e h u m a n i t a r i a n
The UN or INTERFET force was viewed as a legi @ mate actor as compared to ASEAN because it was perceived as being more neutral . INTERFET was aided by the fact that the objec @ ves were clear from the beginning .
assistance .” Thus the mandate was rela * vely simple and clear . Indonesia also became a willing partner in restoring law and order in East Timor .
However , it can be argued that ASEAN could have handled the issue at the regional level , thereby elimina * ng the need for the UN to intervene under Chapter VII , which had caught on as a concept during this phase of the UN ' s func * oning . Doing so would have allowed Indonesia to have a greater say in the end of the conflict , but may have perhaps allowed the conflict to linger on , and beyond desirable limits . One must remember that Rwanda and Srebrenica had just taken place ; and many UN member states as well as the UN Secretary General were concerned that violence could spread and create a humanitarian and security crisis on the scale witnessed in the Balkans . Indonesia ' s willingness to accept an interna * onal force came about due to the pressure the interna * onal community was able to apply on it , which was elusive earlier on , and could have prevented the escala * on of violence . Indonesia succumbed due to pressures — financial , military and economic boycoQ and the moral responsibility of being seen as an interna * onal pariah . Another interes * ng
Image 13 : Ballot papers being transported for the independence referendum in East Timor in 1999
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