Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
century. The guerrilla groups who were forced into the Colombian jungles
found it easy to provide protec*on as well as support to the drug trade in
exchange for much needed finance. Gradually this trade infiltrated not
just the guerrilla cadres, but also the paramilitary forces formed by the
rich elite to guard them against the guerrillas. These groups –
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self Defence Forces of
Colombia) (AUC) – formally disbanded a few years ago, evolved into more
dangerous criminal gangs.
enabled him to resurrect the peace agreement. The UN and the US have
commiQed manpower and resources to monitor, verify and sustain the peace
process, including the ongoing nego*a*ons with the ELN. For the *me being,
it appears that Colombia is on the road to recovery and could conceivably
free all its territory from the scourge of guerrilla forces inimical to the state.
Several hurdles s*ll exist, most importantly the ELN and small bands of
guerrillas who resist reintegra*on into society. The return to ‘normalcy’, for
an indeterminate number of youth, who have known no beQer than the life
of a guerrilla or criminal, will take *me. There are also pending issues of
reseQlement of millions of displaced Colombians and compensa*on
With successive governments distracted by the civil war, powerful drug
cartels – most prominently the one headed by the notorious Pablo
Escobar – established narco*c supply chains. They suborned and
terrorised the establishment, which only
very reluctantly submiQed to pressure Poli@cal ramifica@ons
to seriously pursue and extradite leading
will include the
drug traffickers to the US, where they
could not bribe or threaten the judiciary. strengthening of lei-
Ajer the major cartels were disbanded, wing par@es, with an
smaller groups took their place. With injec@on of
cocaine produc*on increasing over demobilised guerrillas,
recent years, the drug business in
and their claims of
Colombia con*nues to flourish.
This menace cannot be eradicated by money or military power. It requires
poli*cal will – perhaps laws to legalise sojer drugs – and above all, the
ac*ve involvement of the former guerrillas. Even if they were not actually
running the drug opera*ons, they have a fairly good idea of how and
where to look. Colombia's territorial expanse and the inaccessible nature
of the terrain make collabora*on between the military and former
guerrillas vital in what is Colombia’s con*nuing and more important war.
Image 12: Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos prepares to join FARC leader
Timoleón Jiménez in signing a peace accord on September 26, 2016, to end the five-
decade long conflict.
Colombia is an important country for India. In 2016-17, trade dropped to
approximately US$1.35 billion but had crossed US$5 billion a few years
ago, thanks mainly to crude oil exports to India, which Colombia hopes to
increase. India’s state run Oil and Natural Gas Corpora*on Limited
(ONGC) is invested in Colombia’s oilfields. Indian automobile,
pharmaceu*cal, chemicals, and sojware, companies have also invested in
Colombia’s middle income economy with a popula*on of 48 million.
Colombia serves as an example for dealing with non-state actors to
overcome domes*c and cross-