Diplomatist Magazine Annual Edition 2018 | Page 20

Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist inherited a classified society from the past . Historically , it was the Pashtun sec * on of Afghan society that had been in posi * ons of power and controlled the resources , and would never meaningfully share it with other tribes and women . Given that perspec * ve , the Taliban would never be interested in talking about disputes with other tribes and women .
Socio-Poli @ cal History
Historically , there have been various ethnic conflicts in Afghanistan . King Abdur Rahman executed 62 per cent of the Hazara popula * on ( 1880-1901 ,; the Uzbeks experienced massive suppression ( 1841 ), Shah Hotak fought against the Baloch ( 1790 ), and representa * ves of all tribes fought outrageously against each other during civil war ( 1996-2001 ). At the Bonn Conference in 2001 and through the 2004 cons * tu * on , the interna * onal community supported a highly centralised presiden * al system intended to unite the country ' s diverse ethnic groups . This was not a blameless choice in a mul * cultural country with a background of ethnic clashes . Today , the Afghan government receives cri * cism because of lack of inclusiveness , and some tribes believe that they have no control over power and resources . This has added to the complexity of the
In the Cold War era , the an @ -Soviet bloc used to judge Afghanistan ’ s poli @ cal sphere from a Pakistani point of view , and this con @ nued in the post-2001 period . situa * on and lack of trust towards the peace process .
War and Elec @ ons
In the Cold War era , the an * -Soviet bloc used to judge Afghanistan ’ s poli * cal sphere from a Pakistani point of view , and this con * nued in the post-2001 period . Based on that interpreta * on , it can be surmised that if Afghanistan ’ s ruler does not represent the Taliban ’ s ethnicity ( i . e ., the Pashtuns ), the bloodshed will resume and the Taliban will definitely do everything in their power to cause the country to collapse . Pakistan ’ s double game led to an expansion of this narra * ve . Apparently , if Afghanistan ' s leader is not from the tribes who historically fought against the Taliban , it may open the door for compromise ; but in reality , Pakistan could maintain the war by a president that has some compassion with Taliban . The assump * on that Pashtun leadership helps persuade the Taliban towards peace is completely miscalculated . In reality , having President Ghani in the presiden * al palace did not sojen the Taliban ’ s violent ac * vi * es and stance . War con * nued , more villages fell to Taliban control , and Afghanistan lost thousands of civilians , soldiers and officials in extremely deadly aQacks . between the Taliban and some Afghan officials . Despite the Taliban carrying out deadly aQacks , former Afghan President Karzai referred to the former as brothers , and some Taliban members were released from prison and returned to Pakistan . President Ghani too , during his elec * on campaign , to sojen Taliban behaviour , highlighted that he will not tolerate the fact that a majority of Taliban prisoners in Bagram prison are from his tribe .
Iden @ ty of the Taliban
While the Taliban is a problem for Afghanistan , they are now divided into 21 different groups , including the Islamic State ' Khorasan Province ' ( ISKP ). Pakistan is pushing this narra * ve to revamp the Taliban ’ s brutal image and to prepare them for nego * a * on and taking power in Afghanistan . The ISKP — which is another face of the Taliban , as the Head of Afghanistan ' s Na * onal Directorate of Security , Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai , highlighted in his interview with BBC Persian — has been claiming responsibility for most of the Taliban ' s massive and ruthless aQacks in the recent years . In an event the peace deal with the Taliban materialises , Pakistan will s * ll keep terrorism alive via the remaining 20 different iden ** es , using them as the tool and proxy .
Failure of the Peace Deal with Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan
Ajer six years of nego * a * ons , the peace deal with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar , the leader of Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan ( HIA ) materialised . In the beginning , the Afghan people were op * mis * c . But the way the peace deal with the HIA was implemented discouraged people and demoralised the na * onal security forces . In the last ac * on , ajer receiving thousands of
Sympathy Intensifies Conflict
The suspicious involvement and double game played by the US and Pakistan in the Afghan peace process produced a rather poisonous mutual sympathy
Image 6 : Members of the Afghan NaLonal Army search a road for improvised explosive devices .
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