Consumer Bankruptcy Journal Winter 2018 - Page 22

Disclosure of Post-Petition Claims the bankruptcy case proceeding. For further discussion see NACBA’s amicus briefs in Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp. 27 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 190 (U.S. 11th Cir. 2017) here, in Jones v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 811 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2016) here, and Ingram v. AAA Cooper Transp., Inc., 551 B.R. 915, 918 (S.D. Ga. 2016) here. Again, some courts disagree. Rugiero v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 580 Fed. Appx. 376, 379 (6th Cir. 2014) (test of whether debtor is acting on behalf of estate is whether debtor has properly disclosed the cause of action to bankruptcy court, trustee, and creditors); Cowling v. Rolls Royce Corp., Civil Action No. 11-0719, 2012 WL 4762143, at *4-5 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2012) (dismissing civil lawsuit for lack of standing because plaintiff, whose claims arose after he filed for Chapter 13 protection, did not dispute the fact that he never disclosed the civil lawsuit in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, and stating that debtors who disclosed pending lawsuits would have standing to pursue their lawsuits on behalf of the bankruptcy estate); Robertson v. Flowers Baking Co. of Lynchburg, LLC, Civil Action No. 11- 0013, 2012 WL 830097, at *4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2012) (Chapter 13 debtor lost standing regarding undisclosed asset); Kleschik v. Marshalls, Inc., No. 17- 2438, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168188, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2017). Check your jurisdiction. Judicial Estoppel Argument 2 Judicial estoppel is a “doctrine that seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a position inconsistent with one that she has previously asserted in 2 These cases are distinguishable from chapter 7 cases where the debtor has no standing to pursue undisclosed pre- petition claims but post-petition claims would not belong to the chapter 7 estate. 22 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY JOURNAL the same or in a previous proceeding.” Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam- Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court set out the standard in 2001. Under the judicial estoppel doctrine, where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him. Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689, 39 L. Ed. 578, 15 S. Ct. 555. The purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment. Courts have recognized that the circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are not reducible to any general formulation. Nevertheless, several factors typically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case: First, a party’s later position must be clearly  inconsistent with its earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial ac \[Bو[[ۜ\[][ۈ[B]\YY[[ܙX]HB\\[ۈ]Z]\H\܈BXۙ\\Z\Y \ \˜\]\H\HYZ[˜\\[[ۜ\[][ۈ[\]H[[Z\Y[YH܈[\B[[Z\][Y[ۈH[œ\HY\Y [[[Y\][\HXܜ\\\\X\[^XH\\]Z\]\܈[^]\]Hܛ][H܈]\Z[[H\XX[]HوYXX[\[ Y][ۘ[ۜY\][ۜX^H[ܛBH[x&\\X][ۈ[XYX™XX[۝^˂[\ NBBB][\\HXZ[K L̈K˂  K LHˈ N   N L JKH\[YH\\\]Y 8']X^HH\X]H\\\X][ۂوYXX[\[[H\x&\[܂][ۈ\\Yۈ[Y\[H܂Z\ZK'JH [\[][][ۈX\Y[]][ۜZ]Y KY ] N MY[[\X[H\YH] JHBX܈Y[؛Y][ۈ\BH \]][ۈZ[H X\\X[B[ܜX H[Z[Y] B۝[Z[H]Y][ۈ\\[[[ۜ\[][ۋ][\^BHXܸ&\Xو[[Y[Y[\[HZ[H\H][Y[]HYZ[K\YܙKH][Y[[H\\]H]Z]\\[H[YHZ[H]\B\Z\Y X[H\ZHH][ۈ]YB]Z[H\۸&]\Y[[[Y[YY[H]HZ[H[B\Z\Y YHX\X[[[ۂXˈˋ L LMLK LMMB L\ H 8'\HHX܂\ۛYHوHZ[\˜[H[]HۘX[[K\œ][[K[Z]][Y\X[[[[\[X\]HX[\[][ۜ˸'JN[H\\[܈ܙ]؛][ˋ   KL͈ ]\ H ۘY[]YXX[\[\YYX]\BZ[Yۛ[HZ]Y][Z[BH[ܝ\H\\\Nۙ\؈][\\[ˋ LH L L \ MH 8'8)H\\LX܈\[Y[\˜[ܝ\HY[\YXB]][ۈ]\HوX[ۈYš[ۜ\[][ۜ[H[ܝ\B\[H\\H]]\HقX[ۈ\[[˸'JB\][ۈ\]]B[ܝ\BB[[\˂[ܝ\H[H L JJH]\]HY[HX^HH[Y[YHBX܈\HX]\و\H][B[YHYܙHH\H\Y ][œݚY\]H[ܝ\H\X^B][ۘ[\X][ۈوۜ[Y\[ܝ\H]ܛ^\