Consumer Bankruptcy Journal Spring 2016 | Page 52

DEFENSES IN FLORIDA FORECLOSURE Judge Jennemann reviewed this issue and found a, “distinction between delivering and surrendering property.”6 (Emphasis added) Based upon the mostly creditor–favorable results obtained in Briskman’s Cornejo and Jenneman’s Plummer cases, creditors filed motions in bankruptcy courts to reopen closed cases to terminate arduous and strenuous foreclosure defenses by either chapter 7 debtors who had asserted an intention to surrender the property subject to foreclosure; or, chapter 13 debtors who surrendered their interest in the foreclosed property in their confirmed chapter 13 plan. The reopening motions initially were not favorably received. Tardiness Will Affect Creditor’s Rights The Southern District of Florida Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Cristol in Rodriguez understood that even though it was “not disputed that the Debtor filed her Statement of Intention stating her intent to reaffirm the debt, but never executed a reaffirmation agreement . . .”,7 the debtors failure to do so was found not exclusively caused by the debtors. The Rodriguez court found that the creditor was also at fault. The court disdainfully observed the creditor’s failure to do anything for a period of six years. The court further asserted that the reopening of the case years after the closing was not welcomed. Ultimately, the creditor’s motion to reopen Rodriguez – in an attempt to end defenses in the foreclosure matter – was denied pursuant to a simple interpretation of the doctrine of laches.8 Similar concepts occur in 52 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY JOURNAL Chapter 13. In Townsend, the Middle District of Florida’s Bankruptcy Judge Delano similarly stated that a chapter 13 plan’s statement of surrender could not compel the court to require a cease and desist order of the debtor’s foreclosure defense when the creditor’s motion was filed six years after the case’s commencement and after the case was closed.9 The Townsend court also concluded that the relied upon case law supporting the motion [the more recent decisions of Jennemann and others] occurred after the chapter 13 plan’s confirmation and payment. The Townsend court concluded that such case law “. . . should not be applied retroactively to a case filed in 2008.”0 Another Chapter 13 analysis arrived in the Southern District.1 Judge Olson of the Southern District of Florida Bankruptcy Court also encountered a laches issue in Kourogenis when the creditor’s motion was filed more than five years after the case was closed.2 In Kourogenis, Judge Olson concluded that “‘Laches’ is a defense sounding in equity that serves to bar suit by a plaintiff ‘whose unexcused delay, if the suit were allowed, would be prejudicial to the defendant.’ One of the most fu