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would not do justice to its complaints or grievances. Thus the British Officer was the ultimate dispenser of justice and the ma- baap. It was the VCO, however, who advised the ma-baap, and carried out all the unpleasant disciplinary measures. There would have been no more effective way of keeping the Indian soldier isolated from the people. To them the Indian armed forces always remained a mercenary force of occupation. The immense hatred against the army found expression at peak periods of the national movement. This isolation was further strengthened by the very pattern of development of our national consciousness and the main form of struggle ultimately adopted. Individual terrorism was presented as an act designed to inspire armed uprising. On the first anniversary of the attempted assassination of Lord Hardinge in Delhi, a pamphlet Shabash, appeared in Delhi, on 23 December 1919. Referring to the bomb thrown at Viceroy the pamphlet maintained that the “roar of the bomb” represented the voice of the nation. It helped convey the message of freedom to the Indian soldiers, as it was difficult to approach them physically, confined as they were in cantonments. The message was that the British Government could be destroyed and the brave men of India should come out into the field of battle. The First World War presented a great opportunity for the Indian revolutionaries to spread disaffe- ction in the armed forces. Major attempts were made in 1914 and 1915 to trigger a military uprising. The Ghadr party was very active in Punjab. In November 1914 an attempted mutiny on the 23 th Cavalry, stationed at Main Mir near Lahore, was foiled by premature leakage of information. Vishnu Ganesh Pingley came to Punjab at 10 this time. He was joined by Rashbehari Bose and Sacha Singh, a student from Ludhiana. Sacha Singh succeeded in recruiting a retired Havildar of the 9 th Bengal Infantry, who later became a ‘choudari’’ of the regimental bazar. He helped establish links with the soldiers. Secret meetings were held at Meerut, Kanpur, Allahabad, Banaras, Fyzabad and Lucknow. Ghadr served as the organizer and was circulated widely among the solidiers of the 23 th Cavalry at Lahore, the 26 th Punjab at Ferozpur, the 42 nd Deoli Regiment, the 7 th Rajput at Banaras, and the 89 th Punjab at Dinepur and so on. A general uprising was planned. Lahore was to give the signal on 21 February 1915. Fear of discovery led to pushing the date forward by two days. In the confusion the news leaked out and many leaders were arrested. In Burma too, in January 1915 the 130 th Baluch regiment was ready to revolt, under the influence of Ghadr. A mountain battery and the military police also attempted a mutiny. Many were punished. The revolutionaries, however, did not give up easily. Their efforts continued. With a provisional government set up in exile by Barketullah, work started among Indian prisoners of war captured by Germans. Leaflets published in different languages were smuggled into the country and circulated widely among the armed forces. On 23 March 1915; Pingley was arrested in the lines of the 12 th Cavalry. In June, in the 8 th Cavalry, some Indian soldiers killed a number of British officers and men. Ultimately all these efforts failed. In the trials and court-martials that followed many patriots, civilians and military, suffered imprisonment and martyrdom, unhonoured and unsung by their countrymen. One of the main reasons for the failure of these attempts at an armed uprising was the inability to link them up with militant mass movements. This opportunity opened up when Gandhi gave the national liberation struggle a new dimension in the post-war years through mass mobilization. At the same time he circumscribed the action of the masses by choosing as the form of struggles, non- violence and non-cooperation. He recongnised the role of military personnel in the struggle. It was confined only to refusal “to offer themselves for service in Mesopotamia” (Mahatma, D.G. Tendulkar, Volume 2, page 10). During the civil disobedience Gandhi described the state under the British as corrupt and evil and preached the doctrine of disloyalty. He declared: “Indeed loyalty to a state so corrupt is a sin, disloyalty a virtue.” He went even further and said: “It is the duty of those who have realized the evil nature of the system, however attractive some of its features may, torn from their context, appear to be, to destroy it without delay”. At the same time Gandhi insisted on non-violence as the only form of struggle. He said: “Non-violence, that is, civil disobedience is the only and the most successful remedy and is obligatory upon him who would dissociate himself from evil”. (Mahatma, Volume 3, pages 25 to 27). What was more, as far as the armed forces were concerned, Gandhi did not advocate disloyalty to that extent. He made this very clear when he explained his attitude towards the RIN revolt. He referred back to his statements during the non-cooperation movement and said: “The soldiers should declare what they will do soldiering, not for their bellies, but to make India free and to keep her free. I do not want them to be disloyal to the Class Struggle