Civil Affairs Issue Papers Volume 1, 2014-2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers | Page 83

Addressing Policy Constraints On September 11, 2001, 96% of the CA force was in the USAR; the remainder comprised of one Active Component (AC) CA battalion. In post-9/11 operations, the USAR portion of the CA force was activated on a rotational basis under the partial mobilization authority of 10 U.S. Code 12302, which allowed for involuntary activation of Reserve Component (RC) forces for up to 24 consecutive months. Early Army policy dictated that AC and RC units would have standard theater deployment tour lengths of 12 months (known as “Boots on the Ground” time, or BOG). To achieve this, RC units generally mobilized for 16-18 months to allow for post-mobilization train-up periods and post-deployment leave time. DoD policy, however, dissolved the Army’s ability to build, deploy, and redeploy multi-component units on synchronized timelines, first by interpreting 24 consecutive months to mean 24 cumulative months, then by limiting total mobilization time for RC units to 12 months – reducing BOG to about 9 months and imposing a policy goal of five-year “dwell” periods between deployments for RC units and individuals.22 Meanwhile, AC units continued to deploy to a theater for 12 (and sometimes 15) months BOG with a dwell goal of two years. While the dwell goals were never fully realized during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the differing BOG times effectively guaranteed that AC maneuver commands and their supporting USAR CA units would be on different training and deployment schedules, making the development of pre-deployment relationships difficult, if not impossible. 64